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1.0 INTRODUCTION
During the decade of the 80's, digital technology has made rapid advances in automating the
command, control, and communications functions in modern commercial aircraft [Stix 1991]. The
most recent advances include:
• Cockpit Automation: Advanced displays, Side-Stick Controllers, Moving-map displays,
collision-avoidance, flight-management.
• Flight Control: "Fly by wire", the use of digital computers that send commands via wires to
control the aircraft.
• Navigation: Satellite global positioning, Microwave landing.
These advances in electronics have made for complicated cockpits and the potential for subtle
problems. Modern digital systems have been found to be more sensitive to external electromagnetic
interference (EMI) than their analog predecessors. The problem is clearly summarized in Meissner
1989: "Recently, the growing concern of upset to flight-critical, fly-by-wire (FBW) control systems
in military aircraft has been highlighted in technical journals and the media by reports of high-energy
radio frequency (RF) (HIRF) fields insidiously inducing control-system failures that resulted in loss
of aircraft and life." Currently the acronym HIRF is used, meaning high intensity radiated fields, or
high intensity radio frequency interference or high intensity electromagnetic radiation fields [CKC
Labs., 1991]. This study has been supported by NASA Langley to develop information on the nature
of HIRF, its frequency of occurrence, and the consequences of HIRF upsets.
Since there are several sources of EMI an additional discussion of terminology is in order. A
block diagram is given in Fig. 1.1 which presents the terms in a hierarchy. Modern aircraft can be
affected by a variety of different Electromagnetic Interference, EMI, as shown in the top of the
diagram. Three important subclasses are: on-board systems, passenger carry-on devices, and
externally generated.
When on-board systems interfere with one another this is often called
compatibility, EMC. This category also includes problems due to malfunctions within the system in
question. The passenger carry-on devices include disc and tape players, computers, cellular
telephones, etc.
Thethird class, externally generated EMI, includes lithtnin_ as well as man made high intensity
radiated fields, HIRF, which is the focus of this study. HIRF incidents may result in events which
have less severe consequences or those which are more severe and are called upsets.
Digital System upsets can be classified as shown in Table 1.1. Both Fig. 1.1 and Table 1.1 were
developed at NASA Langley.
Much of the work on electromagnetic interference in aircraft has focused on lightning and
the electromagnetic pulse generated by a nuclear explosion [Pitts, Spectrum 1988]. The work on
HIRF has focused on computer models for fields within aircraft and measurement of fields within
aircraft. Intuition would lead one to believe that the fuselage of an aircraft shields against HIRF.
However, ample electromagnetic energy can enter the aircraft through windows, hull penetrations,
and antennas. In fact, the fuselage can sometimes serve as a resonant cavity and thereby increase the
HIRF fields. Furthermore, in the future the use of composite materials for aircraft will result in less
shielding. Also the number of electronic and electrical systems used in aircraft design is increasing.
There is even an MEA (More Electric Airplane) planning team composed of DOD, NASA, and
industry representatives.
Typically, HIRF.problems will occur when a modern aircraft with many Digital Systems flies
too near a large powerful Radar, radio transmitter, or microwave beam. Fields are set up within the
aircraft, they couple into the control electronics of the aircraft, and trigger warning lights, move
control surfaces, disrupt communications, etc.
There are many reasons why HIRF data is difficult to come by. It is often hard to identify the
cause of system upsets, aircraft manufactures and airlines are not too anxious to discuss HIRF
problems because of liability and sometimes proprietary considerations, and events affecting military
aircraft are often protected by military security. Furthermore, the cause of HIRF events may often
be inadvertent effects on civilian aircraft of high powered military operations or covert drug
interdiction - again events requiring secrecy. One source of information has been the Panel for Test
and Analysis Methods of the Aircraft Radiated Environments Subcommittee (AE4R) of the Society
of Automotive Engineers (SAE). This committee was formed in the fall of 1987 in response to the
FAA's desire to draft certification guidelines for protection of aircraft against the hazards of HIRF,
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andhasmet 16times.
Asfar asthisauthorknowsonlyonepreviousstudysimilarto th|sresearch asbeenconducted.
In 1980Cockpit, the pilot association of west Germany published the results of a survey of "Phantom
Symptoms in Complex Airborne Systems." The results showed that electronic computers in aircraft
were subject to soft fails (presumably caused by Alpha-rays and cosmic rays) and that the rate
increased with airplane generation (technology advances). [Taylor 1988]
Because of the problems in gathering such data, the approach taken in this study was an
anonymous questionnaire distributed to experts and used to gather the necessary data. Such
techniques are often called Delphi techniques (after the ancient Greek oracle) [Dalkey 1963] or
Consensus Estimation [Sho0man Jan., Feb., 1977]. This technique is discussed in more detail in Secs.
4 and 5. An advisory group of six knowledgeable people, (either experienced in the HIRF field or
in consensus estimation), was formed to aid the author in compiling a list of experts who would be
sent the form and to critique early drafts of the questionnaire. This group was extremely helpful in
the conduct of the study. (See Sec. 5).
One of the objectives of this study was to be objective and have no preconceived bias, i.e. to
neither believe that HIRF EMI is a rare and insignificant event nor that it is a frequent and dangerous
occurrence. The objective was to develop as much information as possible on the frequency of
occurrence and to let regulators, manufactures, and airlines draw their own informed conclusions.
2.0 RELATIONSHIP OF HIRF TO SAFETY
Many authorities feel that there is a need for special care as advanced technology is applied in
aircraft avionics systems [Taylor 1988, Ch. 12]. Two important technologies, fly-by-wire control
systems and digital avionics are being incorporated in an increasing number of modern designs. As
more critical functions on advanced aircraft are automated the effect of EMI interference can be
severe. Also, digital systems may be more sensitive to such interference and one can offer several
hypotheses as to why this might be so:
1. A small pulse of noise in an analog system is added or mixed with the normal control signal
and is generally a small effect because of the larger signal size. Quantitatively we speak of
the system signal/noise ratio. In the case of a digital signal if the noise pulse flips the least
significant bit (0 to 1 or 1 to 0) this is a small effect in general. However, if the flipped bit
is the most significant bit, a large error can occur.
2. If the noise tends to saturate (temporally disconnect) say the autopilot, the handing dynamics
of the plane may change significantly. Commercial aircraft are dynamically stable
[Anderson 1978, Blakelock, 1991], however this may not be the case in some modern high
performance military or experimental aircraft such as the NASA X-29 aircraft, built by
Grumman. This aircraft is dynamically unstable, and loss of the flight control computers
(redundant for safety) leaves an aircraft which can not be controlled by the pilot.
3. Some digital microelectronic devices are more sensitive to unwanted noise then older analog
electronics.
4. Highly automated systems automatically correct for noise or unbalance. When such systems
are switched off, large and disconcerting imbalances may plague the pilot as he assumes
manual control. A good example of this effect is given in Lee [1991, p. 63] "A wide body
jet on route from Taipei to Los Angeles experienced a loss in power of engine #4 (outermost
right side). The captain failed to notice this problem since the autopilot was compensating.
When the captain switched off the autopilot the plane swung violently to the right, tumbled
out of control into a diving vertical roll and dropped from 41,000 to 11,000 feet over the
Pacific Ocean in two minutes before the pilot regained control. Large chunks were ripped
from the tail fins and landing gear and the wings were bent, however only two minor
injuries occurred".
Sometimes the effects of various radio signals produce unexpected results. If an interference
signal occurs at frequency fl and the system will only respond to signals near frequency f2, then we
feel safe if these two frequencies are widely separated. However, there is the well known effect of
intermodulation interference. Suppose a third frequency f3 is present and signals fl and f3 impinge
on a nonlinearity in a device (say a multiplying effect). Then the well know trigometric identity tells
us that cos(2_rflt) x cos(2,fst) = 0.5[cos(2_r{fl+f3}t) + cos(2*r{fl-f3}t)]. Thus, if either the sum or
difference frequencies are close to f2 unsuspected interference effects can occur.
3.0 EVIDENCE OF HIRF
3.1 Introduction
As was discussed above, the nature of HIRF EMI is such that there have been virtually no
studies of the frequency and nature of occurrence. Most of the work in this area has involved
modeling, simulation, and measurement of the electromagnetic fields in the airspace nearby typical
emitters, the penetration of aircraft fuselages by these fields, amplification of these fields due to
resonances which occur within an aircraft, and the voltages and currents induced in typical wiring
or electrical and electronic circuits by the interior fields.
Most of the evidence.to date of HIRF EMI occurrence is anecdotal, (short stories or accounts
about a happening, usually personal). Clearly a large collection of anecdotes begins to resemble a data
base from which one can draw conclusions. Unfortunately, there are only a small number of such
stories and I have attempted to list and document some of the incidents which have been brought to
my attention in the following section.
3.2 A Collection of Anecdotes About HIRF
The term anecdote comes from the Greek word anekdota which is the plural of anekdotos,
meaning unpublished. The term has come to mean a short entertaining account of some happening,
usually personal or biographical. [Webster, 1959]. In this report we will assume that the teller of the
anecdote is not an eye witness but an intelligent, professionally interested person who has talked to
an eyewitness or heard about the happening. If the teller were an eyewitness we would attempt to
have them fill out a questionnaire and to contribute to the data collected in Sec. 6.0. It is hoped that
some of the readers of this report will contact this author in the future and supply more data on these
incidents, contribute documented anecdotal information on other incidents, or help to put the author
in touch with eyewitnesses to such incidents. These anecdotes are typical of those which have been
reported. For identification purposes, these anecdotes are numbered sequentially in their order of
occurrence.
Anecdote 1:
An airship (blimp) lost power while flying over a Voice of America transmitter at
5
Greenville,NC. The event happened sometime before April 23, 1990. The company service letter
responding to this incident states [Skyships 1990]:
SERVICE LETTER
SUBJECT: ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE
During a recent operation in the state of North Carolina, USA, flying in close proximity to
the "Voice of America" radio transmitter, [an airship] suffered an in-flight double engine
failure. The flight crew followed the appropriate emergency procedures and after a period
of "balloon" flight successfully executed an unpowered landing into a suitable landing area.
Preliminary investigations into the occurrence have indicated a failure of the ignition system
due to extreme electromagnetic interference. It was noted that the units were Mod l status
as opposed to Mod 2 status units. Mod 2 units have a design improvement to attenuate high
frequency interference thereby giving a higher resistance to this type of electromagnetic
interference.
In view of this, all .... pilots have been instructed to avoid flying within a five nautical mile
radius of the "Voice of America" radio transmitter and all other high, intensity radio
transmitter stations. It is strongly recommended that all operators issue the same instruction
to their pilots. Operators should be aware that high intensity radio transmitters are not
always marked on aviation charts and therefore should make their own research to identify
all such transmitters in their operating area.
Mod 2 units are available ..... The units will be supplied free of charge on an exchange
basis.
In "successfully executing an unpowered landing ", the pilot made an emergency landing but
because of wind conditions was forced to use the emergency deflation "knife" which slices open
the top of the envelope allowing all the 235,000 ft a of helium to escape - a major expense. A hard
landing resulted withsome minor damage, however, no one was hurt and the emergency deflation
procedure worked as designed. The failure was due to electronic circuitry failing, (burnout of
microelectronic components?), and on Feb. 28, 1991 the FAA required that all ignition control
units D, Mod 1 or Mod 2 be replaced with Mod 3 units. (FAA 1991).
Anecdote 2:
There have been many reports of suspected HIRF EMI experiences involving Caribbean flights.
The official position of an affected commercial carrier is stated in a short 3 page paper presented
at an SAE (The Engineering Society for Advancing Mobility Land Sea Air and Space) AE4R
Committee (HIRF Committee) meeting [Wright, 1990]. Since 1984 the carrier has experienced
unexplained simultaneous system faults of several aircraft systems, in the Caribbean area and
spreadingtootherareas,(aroundtheGulf of Mexico). The initial problems were with the Inertial
Navigation System, INS, on wide body jet nonstop flights from London, arriving at dusk at
Barbados, in the Caribbean Sea. The standard procedure was to power down the INS when
arriving at the gate. On power up before departure, the INS would not countdown sufficiently for
present position to be entered (on one or more of the three redundant units). One problem unit
was returned to the manufacturer for investigation, and the memory was found to be scrambled
but they could not explain why. Identical INS equipment on a supersonic airliner never reported
faults. No critical systems have been affected. Flight crews sometimes replaced INS systems to
cure the problem. Not all these incidents were reported since flight crews considered these
nuisances. The problem has been temporarily fixed by leaving the INS running during
turnarounds.
Other systems affected by unexplained faults include: pressurization outflow valves, anti-skid
warning lights, window heat, cabin telephone system, air conditioning packs, heat valves. All
these problems occur in the last 500 feet of final approach or on the ground, and all faults clear
before or just after take-off, thus they are not considered a safety hazard.
The unofficial version of these incidents explained to this author by several knowledgeable
sources sheds further light on the cause of these problems. There is a large amount of American
shipboard and airborne surveillance in the Caribbean to intercept drug traffic. Most people feel
that these high-power systems are responsible for most of these problems. Clearly the existence,
operating schedule, frequencies, power levels, and other technical details must be kept secret and
none of these are officially discussed.
Additional information is available in the notes for the CKC Labs HIRF Seminar [1991].
Effected locations are Barbados, Antigua, Bermuda, and Ascension Islands and several airlines and
several types of wide body and narrow body jet aircraft have encountered these difficulties. The
duration of the incidents is typically 10-15 minutes, can last up to 30-35 minutes, and one case
lasted 4 hours.
Anecdote 3:
In 1983 a military fighter crashed in Germany. The crash occurred 1.8 miles from a Voice of
AmericaTransmitterandthefield strengthhasbeenestimatedas70voltspermeter[Lee 1991].
3.3 Evidence of HIRF in Established Data Bases
There are a number of data bases which have been established to collect potential or actual
accident information involving aircraft. The best known is FAA's Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS) run by NASA. [Reynard 1986] This system was established in 1975 by the FAA to serve as
a confidential, nonpunititive incident reporting scheme "to encourage the reporting and identification
of deficiencies and discrepancies in the system before they cause accidents or incidents." On April
15, 1976 the program was modified so that a third party, NASA would receive and analyze the
reports. NASA continues to run the system with the assistance of a contractor who has for several
years been Battelle. With the help and cooperation of Rowena Morrison of ASRS, who served as a
member of the advisory board of this study, an ASRS Search was performed.
On July 17, 1991 I visited the ASRS offices in CA and with the help of Ms. Morrison and an
ASRS researcher searched the data base for evidence of HIRF induced upsets. The initial choice of
key words followed by an hour of experimentation was not very productive in locating any relevant
records. On July 22, 1991 ASRS Researcher Stephanie Frank conducted Search Request No. 2236.
[ARCS 1991] At the time the data base contained 33,193 full-form records received since Jan. 1, 1986
which were searched. (An additional 64,037 abbreviated-form records were not searched, since the
keywords chosen were not identifiable in those records.) The first part of the search uncovered 147
reports which referenced avionics interference or subsystem problems in advanced cockpit aircraft.
The second part of the search uncovered 42 reports referencing lightning strikes. Part one involved
"aircraft equipment problems or loss of aircraft control by an aircraft with automated navigation
equipment. Each report also contained one or more of the following key words: "antenna,"
"international operations," "passenger electronic devices," "military airspace," or "lightning," Clearly
part 1 and 2 were not mutually exclusive and some reports were located in both searches, for example
Accession Number 52386 appeared in both parts.
Accession Number 52386:
The report involves a wide body aircraft hit by a lightning strike just south of NYC. The
report is by the Copilot. A portion of the one page report follows: "... we were given instructions
to 'hold at sates' ... 'hold southwest of sates on the Deer Park 221 radial, left turns'...'the Captain,
disgruntled over the ambiguity of the holding instructions demanded to know the DME from Deer
Park to SATES hold. I [Copilot] leaned over to my right to extract the New York (Northeast) low
ait area chart from my flight bag when I heard 'PUUFF' like an air rifle shot and simultaneously
winced at the white blinding flash of lightning. It took several seconds to blink away the flash
while I resumed search for our specific holding pattern on the chart. At this time the captain
hollered 'what the hell happened to our altitude! Isn't anyl_ody watching! Give me some help up
here!' The autopilot had tripped off and as I glanced up from my chart the altimeter read 6600
ft., 400 ft. below our assigned altitude of 7000 ft." The Captain quickly recovered and reinstated
the autopilot. [Subsequently both autopilots were used and both tripped off possibly due to gust
loading and stabilizer out of trim condition, never-the-less they managed to remain within 200-
300 feet of their assigned altitude.]
Other reports from part 1 are summarized below:
Accession Number 10373_:
A wide body on approach to LaGuardia failed to receive normal clearance from ZDC. Captain
attempted to contact ZDC with no avail. Finally they were able to contact another carrier and
were eventually able to contact ZNY and Boston center who provided vectors into LaGuardia via
#2 radio. On subsequent flight two days later the Captain and other carriers heard what were
apparently citizens' band radio transmissions on ZDC frequency in the same area. ZDC said that
citizens band interference had been occurring for the past two weeks and that the FCC was
investigating.
Clearly one must understand some pilot "lingo" to fully understand the above accounts, however,
the general details show several documented incidents of passenger equipment causing RFI, at least
one incident of HIRF EMI (the CB radio), and several unexplained incidents. The lightning events
were not studied further. The term callback is a name used by ASRS to describe selected reports
whicharefollowedupby phonecallsfrom ASRSmembersto obtainfurther details.
Many of the respondents suggested the study of other military and civilian data bases for
evidence of HIRF EMI, however, such studies were beyond the scope of this grant.
4.0 EXPERT DATA COLLECTION
4.1 Introduction
The six members of the advisory committee made substantial contributions to the conduct of
this study. Gerry Fuller of CKC Labs. has conducted many HIRF studies, consults in this area, and
gives several HIRF seminars each year and is a member of the SAE AE4R committee. Rowena
Morrison is a Research Coordinator on the Batelle staff of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting
System Office. Felix Pitts has guided electromagnetic compatibility research for many years at NASA
Langley Research center and was the research monitor for this grant. Ronald Rogers is an airline
Captain and engineer, is Chairman of the Airline Pilots Association's New Aircraft Evaluation and
Certification Committee, and is Chairman of the Data Accuracy Panel of the SAE AE4R committee.
Joe Fragola a Vice President of SAIC and Herbert Hecht, President of SoHar Inc., have many years
of experience in aircraft safety and consensus estimation.
Consensus estimation only works if one has a set of knowledgeable experts. Thus recruiting a
large sample of people who know little about HIRF is of little use. Inherently such a selection
produces a biased sample. The group of 230 experts who were mailed questionnaires were chosen in
three ways. The members of the SAE AE4R committee were all included (engineers, engineer/pilots,
and pilots) and a number of additional names were suggested by the advisory committee for a total
of 187. In addition, Captain Ronald Rogers from the Airline Pilots Association (a member of the
advisory committee) and Bob Hall from the Airline Pilots Association Staff were very helpful in
obtaining the names of 33 airline pilots who made up the remainder of the 230 experts, (57 of whom
responded).
4.2 Choice of the Sample
It was felt that the group of SAE AE4R members were all biased in the direction of having
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more familiarity with HIRF then an unbiased group of avionics experts or pilots. The group of 33
airline pilots were simply a group who agreed to help so they represented an unbiased sample.
The choice of bias was an advantage in that it improved the probability of receiving enough
respondents who had seen HIRF EMI in such a small sample. However, it was a disadvantage in that
the occurrence rates should be higher than those expected in an unbiased sample of airline pilots.
It was discussed in See. 3.2, that pilots in the Caribbean are likely to have seen HIRF EMI,
however, it is unlikely that many of the pilots who responded had Caribbean flight experience.
During the course of this study it came to the authors attention the US military maintains an
agreement with commercial airlines which allows them to "draft" commercial aircraft during a national
emergency. Many pilots were "drafted" to fly in the Persian Gulf War. Donnegan & Bay [1992] cite
the following information: Wide body jets were drafted in large numbers to assist in the movement
of troops and equipment. Most of the troops were flown over, and most of them flew in wide bodies
loP.tit, p. 209]. Three hundred wide bodies were used [op.cit. p.219]. The following Quote from
Schwartzkopf's Autobiography [1992, p. 341] verifies the use of commercial wide bodies: "By late
August Saudi Arabia had absorbed more of our troops and military hardware than it had in its own
armed forces ..... I went out to the air base at Dhahran ..... Near where I stood [a wide body had pulled
up] and I watched soldiers from the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division stumbling out into the 130-
degree heat".
Clearly there was a high probability that the "drafted" pilots observed HIRF EMI in the military
theater of operations, however, none of them were included in this study.
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5.0 DATA COLLECTION FORM
An initial draft of the data collection form was formulated by this author in July 1991 with
major help and critiques by Gerry Fuller. After a number of drafts, the form was circulated to the
entire advisory committee and other for review and critique. After several months and numerous
written and oral changes and additions, the final form given in Appendix A was developed. Final
typing, editing, and printing of the Questionnaire took place in the Spring of 1991 and the mailing
began in the late Spring.
During the instruction with the questionnaire it was decided that rather than ask the
respondents about just HIRF EMI, a broader class of RFI events would be included. This was done
for two reasons. First it was felt that if only HIRF EMI events were included it was possible that
respondents would include other sources of events which were not HIRF EMI. Secondly, it is
sometimes easier to define something by saying what it is not, i.e. HIRF EMI is not interference
caused by a passenger cellular telephone, HIRF EMI is not interference from the high frequency radio
on a specific narrow body jet which is known to couple into the autopilot, HIRF EMI is not lightning
effects, HIRF EMI is not effects due to equipment failures.
The data collection form was sent out to 187 participants between May 20, 1992 and May 22,
1992 and a subsequent group of 33 participants on June 30, 1992. After the second mailing
approximately 10 names were suggested and mailings to these individuals were done the day received
or the next. Thus, the total population contacted was 230. The survey forms were marked when
received with a set of sequential numbers and the date received• Typically, the bunched forms were
opened in batches a few days after receipt, except for travel periods when larger batches accumulated.
If there were any uncertainty about the date received, it was estimated from the postmark. In an
attempt to obtain additional returns, a second letter dated August 12, 1992 was sent to participants.
(See Appendix A for a copy of this letter•)
6.0 COLLECTED DATA
6.1 Overall Features of Data Analysis
Between May 5 1992 and October 15, 1992, 57 responses were received, thus 25% of the
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participantsreplied,ahighratio for asurvey.(Typically,surveyformshavearesponserateof afew
percent.)OnNov.25, 1992a58thresponsewasreceived,after thefirst 57hadbeenanalyzed.It was
sparselyfilled outanddid notaddmuchadditionaldata,thusit hasnotbeenincludedin theanalysis.
Aboutamonthlatera59thresponsewasreceivedwhichdid includedataonexternalEMI. Sincethe
otherdatahadalreadybeentabulated,it wasnot included.Thepreliminaryanalysisof theresponses
is givenin Table6.1,which listssomemajorfeaturesof theresponses.Thisdataisprimarily derived
from Secs.l.l, 1.2,2.1, and6.0 asindicatedin the Tableheading.A bar graphof the numbers
returnedin eachtwo weekinterval isgivenin Fig. 6.1. (Notethat response1onMay 5 is grouped
with theJune1responses.This wastheresultof a mailingto a formerastronautof thenext to the
last iterationof the questionnaire.He not only sentsuggestions,but filled out the questionnaire
himself.) One of the goals of this study was to maintain a high degree of objectivity. Thus, this
chapter is devoted to reporting and preliminary analysis of the data collected and interpretation is
reserved for the following chapter.
After study of each data collection form, some interpretation was required in recording the
data. It was clear that most respondents were intelligent, busy, interested and cooperative. To fill
out this form in detaii, answer every question, and recall experiences over many years of one's
professional history can take several hours. Not all respondents spent that much time, and frequently
there were comments in the margins in later pages indicating that earlier sections should be changed
now that they better understood the form. (They probably didn't read it through before starting to
fill it out.) In one case, a respondent went back with a red pen and corrected his responses. In other
cases, I made such corrections once I understood the marginal comments. Interpretation played some
role in recording the responses. Some obvious cases were interpreting never observed as zero
incidents, 2-3 incidents as 2.5 incidents, and 1000's as 2,000. Other interpretations are commented
on later as appropriate.
6.2 Respondents Experience Base (Aircraft Types)
In Sec. 1.0 the respondents delineated their professional expertise and types of aircraft with
which they were familiar. This data was accumulated for the 57 responses and is given as totals on
13
asurveyform. (SeeAppendixB.) In all about144professionswerechecked,thusmostrespondents
wereinvolvedin aboutthreeprofessionalareasover their careers, with engineers the most common
(57) and pilots (29) the second most common. In addition, the respondents had experience with
hundreds of different aircraft types.
In Sec. 2.2 and 2.3, Appendix B, the respondents characterized the types of aircraft affected
by EMI incidents. Again a wide variety of aircraft were represented.
A goal of high importance was to obtain an estimate of frequency of occurrence of HIRF EMI
events. Thus, emphasis is placed during analysis of the data on responses to questions concerning
frequency of occurrence.
6.3 Number of Avionics EMI Events
In Sec. 2.0 the respondent was asked to report the number of EMI events which they were
familiar with, and in Sec. 4.0 they were asked for more details on the nature of such events. The
number of EMi results reported by category are listed in Table 6.2. In theory, the number of
incidents reported in Sec. 2.1 should equal the sum of those reported in each category of Sec. 4.0. For
example, for response 21, the 5 incidents reported were distributed as l external, l lighting, and 2
equipment failure. However, the number of incidents did not always equal the sum of those reported
in each category.
To better understand how Sec. 4 was interpreted we examine two responses in detail.
Respondent 20 reports 2-3 incidents butt indicates 2 onboard, l lighting, and 3 equipment failure for
a total of 6. More specifically, Sec. 4.1 was not checked and in Sec. 4.2 two checks appeared: VHF-
UHF transmitter and computer. I judged that these were two separate Radio Frequency Interference,
RFI, incidents rather than one which was caused by an interaction of VHF-UHF transmitter and the
computer. No checks appeared in Sec. 4.3 and strike-airborne was checked in Sec. 4.4. In Sec. 4.5,
intermittent transient, and hard failures were checked. I judged this to be 3 separate incidents rather
than three manifestations of a single incident. No items were checked in Sec. 4.6. I feel that the
explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that initially this respondent remembered 2-3 incidents,
however, when asked more details in Sec. 4.0 more incidents were remembered, however, he did not
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gobackto Sec.2.1andincreasehistotal. This interpretationiscorroboratedsincein eachcasewhere
asked"howsureof you of the source (affected system)", he answered certain (10).
In the case of respondent 19, he reported some details in Sec. 4.0 on 13 of the 1530 incidents
he had data on. Clearly he did not observe 1530 incidents. He reports zero incidents in the first three
categories of Sec. 2.1, and estimates approximately 30 incidents from conversations, approximately
500 from data reports, and approximately 1000 anecdotal accounts. I believe the 13 incidents discussed
in Sec. 4.0 are those to be focused on. Similar interpretations were made for some of the other
responses.
6.4 Consistency Check
In Sec. 4.7 the respondents were asked to estimate the percent of all EMI incidents which were
due to passenger RFI, onboard RFI, etc. The results of this question appear in Table 6.3. One of the
purposes of this question was to provide a consistency check on the number of events in each category
reported in Table 6.2. In order to compare the number of events in Table 6.2 with the percentages
in Table 6.3, the data in Table 6.2 was converted into percentages in Table 6.4. For example
respondent 1 reported Zero passenger events in Table 6.2 and one in each of the other 5 categories.
Thus, in Table 6.4, 0% were passenger incidents, and 20% were associated with each of the other
categories. Because of roundoff, not all the percentages in Table 6.4 add to exactly 100%. A
comparison of Tables 6.3 and 6.4 shows that 21 respondents answered the questionnaire completely
enough so that the percentages in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 could be compared. The two sets of data are
compared in Table 6.5.
Several methods are available for comparing the relationship between two such sets of data.
Suppose we wish to check the two sets of data for consistency. In the ideal case, we assume that the
respondents wrote down their observations on scrap paper and answered sections 4.0 and 4.7 by
referring to that set of data. In such a case, we would expect the responses to be the same and would
see identical entries in Table 6.5, indicating a linear relationship between the two sets of data. A
simple test for such a linear relationship is to plot the two sets of data on a Cartesian coordinate
system and examine the resulting graph. Such graphs are plotted in Fig. 6.2 for two respondents, #1
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and#14. Thedatain Fig. 6.2 seems to approximately fit a horizontal straight line through y=20. This
indicates that the y values do not increase with x but stay constant. In Fig. 6.2b we see quite a
different situation where a straight line connecting the points (0,0) and (40,40) seems to fit the data
well. In statistical terminology, we would say that x and y were poorly correlated in Fig. 6.2a and
well (highly) correlated in Fig. 6.2b. In fact, a more objective procedure is to calculate the coefficient
of correlation r which is defined in Appendix C. A correlation of r=+l indicates a perfect linear
relationship, all the points fall on a line through the origin with a slope of 45 °. A correlation of r=- 1
indicates a perfect linear relationship along a line through the origin with a slope of 135". No
correlation, r=0, represents a horizontal straight line. The values of r are given in the last column of
Table 6.5 and were calculated using a simple PC computer program, written in BASIC, which
implemented the formulas in Appendix C.
We wish to establish an objective procedure for deciding when r is large enough so that we can
classify individual responses as consistent or possibly inconsistent. In Appendix C, we compare the
hypothesis that the responses are uncorrelated (r is actually 0) and by chance the data exhibited some
correlation with the hypothesis that a result 0<r<l truly represents correlation. If we use a
probability of 0.1 that correlation was by chance, then chance correlation is rejected as long as 0.6
<r< 1.0. Examining Table 6.5 we see that 13 responses qualify according to this criteria: #8, 14, 15,
16, 18, 23, 27, 30, 32, 33, 34, 55, 56.
The data in Table 6.5 was compared in another way. The values for external EMI (the HIRF
data we seek) were analyzed by studying the correlation of the estimated and calculated values, for
the 13 data sets where r>0.61 and for all the 21 data sets. The results are given in Table 6.6.
6.5 EMI Occurrence Frequencies
The consistency analysis of the previous section dealt with percentages of the various EMI
events. We now discuss the occurrence rates of the various EMI events. We begin by analyzing in
greater detail the data collected in Sec. 2.1. The first observation is that the pilots or pilot/engineers
are in general reporting events which they have experienced or which have been reported to them,
whereas the EMI Specialists and Engineers are reporting on data in a data base collected by their
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company,governmentorganization,etc.Thus,wesplit thedatainto twogroupsfor presentationand
lateranalysis.Table 6.7 lists observational intervals (years, flights) and number of incidents of all
EMI incidents as reported by pilots. The data is sparse and only the observations as a pilot seem
worthy of further study. The total number of EMI incidents observed by pilots from Table 6.7, along
with the calculated EMI incidents/year, EMI incidents/flight, means and standard deviations are
given in Table 6.8. Examination of response number 27 reveals a relatively small number of flights,
a large number of observed events, and a large frequency per flight. Applying a statistical test for
outliers as described in Appendix C.3 verifies that it is wise to reject this datum, concluding it is from
a different population than the other 11. Inspection of the recalculated moments, (see footnote to
Table 6.8), shows that the new mean is about half the previous value and the new variance is about
1/3 as large; another validation of the advantages of dropping this one point from the other 11. If
we examine the frequency per year reported by respondent number 23, we see that the value of 5 also
looks a little high, and statistical analysis shows that this datum as well as the value 2 should be
rejected. We conclude that these two points are from a different population than the other 14, and
the means and variances decrease.
The observational intervals (years, flights) and number of incidents of HIRF EMI incidents
(external EMI) observed by pilots are calculated per pilot year and per flight are calculated as are the
means and standard deviations. The number of events is from column 8 of Table 6.2 and the pilot
years and pilot flights from Table 6.8.
The frequency of all EMI incidents for the EMI Specialist/Engineer respondents is given in
Table 6.10. The data is fragmentary for observation as a pilot or crew member, as it should be. EMI
specialists and engineers can be private pilots and occasional crew members (for example on test
flights), however, these are infrequent roles for this group. One could even argue that the pilot
observations of respondent 19 and 33 should be grouped along with the pilot responses in Table 6.7,
however, this was not done since 10 and 33 contribute little data. In the cases of conversations,
reports, and anecdotes there is considerable data, however, it is unclear how to calculate rates. In all
likelihood, this is from a data base constructed by adding many individual observations of incidents.
Although the number of incidents should be trustworthy, it is not clear whether the years of
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observationandthe total number of flights are as clearly defined as in the case of pilots. However,
the passenger observations in Table 6.10 (and those of pilots who are passengers in Table 6.7)
represent a known population and can be used to calculate occurrence frequencies. This data appears
in Table 6.11. A similar table is constructed for HIRF events from the event reports in Sec. 4.3 and
the interval data in Table 6.10 (see Table 6.12). In the case of HIRF, it is likely that the events in Sec.
4.3 reported by engineers were not personal observations but study of reports. In fact it is possible
that more than one person is reporting on the same event.
During the study of data from Tables 6.7 and 6.10 for constructing Tables 6.11 and 6.12, I
observed that many respondents left blank the section on observations of EMI incidents as a
passenger. Also a few listed 0 observations. I judged the blank responses as "no opportunity to
observe" and did not count them. On the other hand, a response of 0 was judged to mean: "I would
have recognized upset incidents as a passenger, I didn't observe any, thus the number is zero", and
these were counted. In studying the responses in Sec. 4.3, both blank responses and O's will be
counted as 0 in Table 6.12. Clearly some of these flights must have been test flights with engineers
sitting with the crew, passenger pilots sitting with or talking to flight captains or crew, or "regular"
pilot-passengers or engineer-passengers on regular commercial flights. No attempt was made to
differentiate between these different types of observations, in this section or other sections of the
questionnaire.
One can recalculate the upset data in Tables 6.8 and 6.11 for only the most consistent observers,
i.e. those with r ,_0.6 in Tables 6.5. The sample sizes become much smaller and the results are given
in Tables 6.13 and 6.14.
6.6 Anatomy of EMI Events
In addition to the statistics presented above, there is much information of a qualitative nature
which was contained in the survey. Some of this material is contained in the comments which were
given in Sec. 6.0 of the questionnaire. These reports have been reproduced verbatim in Appendix D
and report a wide variety of different events. There is also additional information to be gained by
studying the overall picture given by the 6 pilots who reported observing HIRF (c.f. Table 6.9). A
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brief compositeof thesereportsisgivenbelow:
#1 Pilot:
This military and commercial pilot who also was an astronaut and had engineering training
has over 20 years of experience and has flown many different aircraft including business jets,
single engine turboprop, military fighter, bomber, fighter/bomber, and tankers, and the Space
Shuttle. He witnessed 5 EMI incidents as a pilot involving military fighter, bomber,
fighter/bomber, and the Space Shuttle. The upsets occurred with avionics in good condition
during ascent, descent, and earth orbit in clear or clouds or rain reducing visibility. Incidents
of onboard RFI were caused by the VHF-UHF transmitter, radar, intercom, and navigation
equipment affecting the communications and navigation equipment, and instrumentation.
External RFI, HIRF, was caused by military radar, air traffic control radar, and shipboard
radar transmitters which affected communication and navigation equipment as did the lightning
incidents when they were observed. Also transient equipment failures and unknown failures
affect the communications and navigation system. The certainty of these upsets was rated
between 7 and 10. The criticality of the onboard RFI was rated as 3, the External RFI 5, those
due to lightning as 6, and the equipment failure and unknown as critically 2. Additional
comments appear in Appendix D.
#11 Pilot:
This corporate pilot who also has engineering training has over 20 years of experience and
has flown many different aircraft including narrow body, business jets, heavy twin turboprop,
light twin turboprop, single engine turboprop, and helicopters. He witnessed 5 EMI incidents
as a pilot and 3 as a crew member, learned of 3 from study of reports, and others from contact
with certification projects. The types of aircraft affected were business jets, single engine
turboprops and piston. The EMI incidents occurred with avionics in good condition (or a
design problem with a particular subsystem), during straight and level flight, descent, low-level
flight, and low traffic in both clear and medium visibility. Incidents of onboard RFI caused
by the high frequency transmitter affected the autopilot causing pitch oscillations. External
RFI, HIRF, was caused by commercial AM or short wave transmitters which affected the
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autopilot andenginecontrols. Lightning(strike-indirect)affectedthe autopilot, navigation
equipment, and instrumentation. Transient and electrostatic discharge equipment failures,
affected navigation equipment and instrumentation. Unknown sources affected the autopilot
and engine controls. The certainty of these events was rated as 10 except for lightning (6) and
equipment failures 8. He rated the EMI reported of criticality 5 or 6. Additional comments
appear in Appendix D.
#15 Pilot/Eneineer:
This military and nonscheduled pilot and engineer with over 30 years of experience has
flown many different aircraft and studied reports on upsets. The aircraft affected by HIRF
included: wide body and narrow body jets, helicopters, airships, business jets, and a military
fighter. He witnessed 8 incidents of EMI as a pilot and has learned of many other incidents
from conversations, reports, and anecdotal accounts. The weather conditions and equipment
condition were not significant, and incidents occurred during landing, takeoff, straight and
level flight, taxiing, and while parked. An incident of passenger RFI due to a portable tape
player affected navigation ILS and VOR receivers and the diagnosis was certain (10). Onboard
RFI incidents included the instrument panel lightning circuit which affected the magnetic
compass, and the high frequency transmitter affecting the autopilot on a narrowbody jet.
External RFI, HIRF, included countermeasures equipment on military airplanes affecting
various systems on commercial aircraft in the vicinity, Voice of America Transmitter, land and
shipboard military radar, ECM and jammer equipment effecting communications equipment,
helicopter flight controls, panel lights, and automated landing gear brake. Lightning was
observed to affect accidental firing of sounding rockets, disrupt navigation equipment, and
produced an ear splitting noise in a communications headset. Equipment failure was transient
and affected communications and navigation equipment. The diagnosis of the causes and
effects of all the above EMI was listed as certain (10). The criticality of the various EMI was
rated at various levels; passenger RFI 4, Onboard RFI 3, External RFI 5 or 10 lightning 2, and
equipment failure varying with the technology level of the effected systems. Additional
comments appear in Appendix D.
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#21 Pilot/Manager:
This former military pilot and manager with over 20 years of experience has flown single
engine piston, military trainers, helicopters, and turboprop transports. He has witnessed about
5 incidents of EMI as a pilot, and the aircraft affected was a turboprop transport. The EMI
occurred on aircraft with avionics in good condition during flight maneuvers in clouds or rain.
The EMI was listed as external RFI or equipment failure and was analyzed as such by this
author, however upon checking all the forms this one form was found that respondent *,21
listed under External RFI incidents which caused communications equipment and
instrumentation disturbances, and these may have been caused by lightning. Thus, response
21 could be reanalyzed, shifting some upsets from external EMI to lightning. If this were to
be done the data for forms 58 and 59 would be included, and the net results would change only
slightly. (See Sec. 8.0.) EMI due to equipment failure was listed as causing transient failures
of communications equipment, instrumentation, and radar. Respondent #21 rated EMI caused
by lightning and equipment failure of severity 2. Additional comments appear in Appendix
D.
#23 Pilot/En2ineer:
This commercial and corporate pilot and engineer with over 30 years of experience has
flown several different aircraft including business jets, light twin turboprop, and single engine
turboprop. He has witnessed about 100 incidents of EMI as a pilot, and the aircraft affected
were turboprop aircraft. The EMI events occurred on aircraft with avionics in good condition
during straight and level flight, ascent and descent, and weather conditions were deemed not
significant. The onboard computer, radar, EFIS, FMS, and Flight Director Systems affected
communications and navigation systems. Diagnosis of source was certain (10), because "on the
ground we pulled circuit breakers until the interference stopped ...... " and the system affected
was certain (10) since "interference can be clearly heard on the VHF COM, VOR,and ADF
receivers and deviations in the VOR and ADF Navigation data are also clearly evident". HIRF
effects caused by a commercial FM transmitter affected communications and navigation
equipment and the identification was certain (10) since the FM voice transmissions could be
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clearly heard in the VHF COM and the VOR/LOC receiver. An airborne lightning strike
burned out the diodes in the engine driven alternator, the output went to zero and the faulty
diodes were found during ground maintenance. Respondent #23 rated EMI caused by onboard
and external RFI of severity 4 and the others of severity 5. Additional comments appear in
Appendix D.
#40 pilot:
This military and commercial pilot with over 30 years of experience (since 1941) has flown
many different aircraft including wide body, narrow body, regional jets, heavy twin turboprop,
and military fighters. He witnessed several incidents of EMI as a pilot and crew member and
learned of one other by conversation and one by reading a report. The types of aircraft
affected were narrow body and regional jets. The upsets occurred on aircraft with avionics in
good condition during landing, straight and level flight, and descent in both clear and cloudy
or rainy weather. One event involved what was thought to be unknown origin which affected
the autopilot and navigation equipment. An incident of onboard RFI caused by navigation
equipment affected the autopilot, spoilers, and navigation equipment. Both these events were
later diagnosed on the ground. Two other events were determined with certainty when they
occurred and involved a hand held walkie-talkie [HIRF] and lightning. He rated upsets caused
by lightning and equipment failure of concern (criticality 4), however, he reports that he heard
of a narrow body which "banked sharply and dropped 20,000 [ft.]" - [which certainly sounds
like a more serious situation.] Additional comments appear in Appendix D. [Unfortunately
further details on the walkie-talkie, HIRF-incident were not given].
6.7 Attributes Associated with HIRF
A large number of the questions answered by the respondents dealt with various qualitative
attributes and details of their experience. For example, in question 1.I, most of the respondents had
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manyyearsof experiencewhich encompasseda numberof different roles, thus out of the 57
respondents, there were 29 checks for some type of pilot experience and 57 checks for some type of
engineer, physicist, or mathematician experience. Thus, the survey covered a wide variety of
experience. A summary of the responses to question 1.1 appears in Appendix B.
Question 1.3 dealt with the types of aircraft with which the respondents were familiar. They
covered a wide range of commercial and military aircraft. In the case of commercial aircraft 28 types
were checked plus an airship, 5 types of helicopters, and 15 others were specified. Although the more
popular types of aircraft were better represented, there was no predominant type. Similar results were
found for business jet, turbo prop, and military/government types. In questions 2.2 an 2.3 the
respondents discussed the types of aircraft affected by the various EMI incidents they were reporting
on. Again popular types were more prevalent, but there was no predominant type. Detailed
Summaries appear in Appendix B.
In questions 3.1 and 3.2 the respondents were asked under what conditions EMI occurs. A wide
variety of flight conditions and weather conditions were reported and no consensus seemed to appear.
Question 3.3 dealt with level of maintenance and most of the respondents checked either good
condition [17] or design problems with a particular subsystem [9].
In section 4, the types of RFI sources and systems affected were treated and the surety of the
source and affected systems were probed. In summary the results showed:
• For Passenger RFI: Sources were difficult to determine [5.3] and affected a number of different
equipments, however the affected systems were easier to determine [7.6].
• For Onboard RFI: The most common sources were radio transmitters and all sources were
relatively easy to determine [8.8] as were the systems affected [8.8] which were most commonly
communications or navigation equipment.
• For External RFI: The most common sources were various types of radar equipment [15
reported] and various types of radio transmitters [12 reported]. All sources were relatively easy
to determine [8.9] as were the systems affected [9.0] which included several types of systems.
• For Lightning: An airborne strike was most common and it was easy to determine the source
[9.2] and the system affected [9.1]. The affected system was most commonly
communications or navigation equipment.
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• For EquipmentFailure: Transient failures were most common, the source was fairly easy
to determine [7.8], as was the various systems affected [7.9].
• For Unknown Sources: Only affected systems could be determined and the surety level was
high [8.8]. Several different systems were affected.
Because of the small sample size and the fairly even distribution of the various sources and
systems affected (except as specified above), numerical computations of the various frequencies were
not attempted. The reader is referred to Appendix B for further details.
7.0 INTERPRETATION OF DATA
7.1 Introduction
This report is based on a data gathering effort which is somewhere between a survey and the
creation of a data base. In the case of a survey, one would expect mainly qualitative information and
much interpretation of the responses would be required. On the other hand, creation of a data base
involves the collection of quantitative data and statistical interpretation. Since EMI in general and
HIRF in particular is not easy to define, much of the construction of the questionnaire and its
interpretation involved reading the responses in entirety and getting the sense of the respondent
before using the data. In general, the respondents seemed to be a highly qualified, intelligent, and
interested group and the response rate of over 25% (quite high for surveys in general) testified to
these facts. However, by and large they seemed to be busy people and did not have time to study or
ponder over the questions. This was evidenced by the fact that in some cases they went back over
the form and corrected responses or left marginal notes regarding corrections of their responses once
the import of particular questions became clearer. Several such cases where interpretation was
required were discussed in Sec. 6. Statistical tests for outliers were applied to the approximately 10
samples in Table 6.8 and a few were found to be outliers, however, the means and standard deviations
were reported both with and without the outliers. No attempt was made to apply such techniques to
the approximately 5 samples of Table 6.9 and 6.11 or the two samples of Table 6.12. Common sense
tells us that with such small populations all the data points are needed, and rejection of outliers in
very small populations may be questioned regardless of the results of such statistical hypothesis
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testing. Thus,the interpretationsin the remainder of this section will contain both qualitative and
quantitative aspects.
7.2 Consistency of Data
The use of consensus estimation and expert opinion, relies on the recollections of a group of
experienced experts. In some cases, the experts actually have data and reports on which to base their
estimates, but because of proprietary, secrecy, privacy, or other such reasons, they can not quote the
data but can provide their professional estimate (based on the data). During analysis of the 57
responses, it seemed clear that only a few of the respondents were replying based on an established
data base, and that most of them were trying to recollect as best as possible actual situations they had
witnessed. Anticipating that such would be the case, some questions were asked from two different
viewpoints, so that subsequent analysis of the similarity of the responses could be used as a rough
gauge of the consistency of the respondents recollections. The correlation coefficients of 13 of the
21 respondents in Table 6.5 (62%) had a high enough correlation > 0.6 to reject the hypothesis that
they were uncorrelated. Furthermore, in Table 6.6 the means, standard deviations, and correlations
of the data showed quite reasonable agreement. Thus, in general the data collected seem to be
internally consistent, especially for the smaller set of 13 respondents.
7.3 Occurrence Rates - Point Estimates
A major focus of this study was to determine the occurrence rate of avionics EMI caused by
HIRF. Also to help differentiate HIRF from other EMI, data was taken on several EMI sources
which affect avionics operation. The occurrence rates listed in Tables 6.8 - 6.14 are reported as point
estimates, (mean value used as the point estimate), in Table 7.1.
Studying Table 7.1 we see that the frequency per year of all EMI upsets observed by pilots
varies between 0.25 and 1.56 depending on how we treat the data statistically. This is a range of
about 6:1 and much of this variation is probably due to the small sample size. The frequency per 1000
flights varies from 2.60 to 7.93, a range of only about 3:1 which would lead one to believe that some
of the large range of occurrences per year is due to fairly wide variations in the number of flights
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reportedper year. An examination of Table 6.8 shows a mean number of flights equal to 2,691 and
a standard deviation of 2,068 which reinforces the above conjecture that the number of flights per
year varies considerably.
The number of all EMI events observed by passengers varies over a smaller range than that of
pilots. Also we see that the number of observations per year is less for passengers than pilots,
(probably because they are on fewer flights), however, The number of EMI upsets per flight varies
less between pilot and passenger groups.
When we observe the HIRF occurrence frequencies in Table 7.1 we find that for pilots HIRF
occurrences represent about 3.6% of all EMI events incidents per year and about 1% of the EMI
incidents per flight. In the case of passengers, HIRF incidents represent about 80%, (seems unlikely
that this should be so high), of all EMI occurrences per year, and about 8.4% of the incidents per
flight.
The number of avionics systems which are potentially sensitive to HIRF has been increasing
rapidly in recent years. Thus, the values of occurrences/flights or occurrences/year may have been
increasing in recent years. The values reported in the questionnaire do not indicate the years in which
the EMI incident occurred, thus only averages over the respondents experience period can be
computed. Thus, the data can not be analyzed to see if occurrence rates incease with calendar years.
7.4 Occurrence Rates - Interval Estimates
Because of the wide dispersion of the data it may be more appropriate to deal with interval
estimates. Interval estimates for the occurrence rate data can be computed using the statistical
techniques described in Appendix C. These are computed for the most significant data, the frequency
of HIRF occurrences per flight and are given in Table 7.2.
7.5 Criticality of EMI Events
In evaluating the effect of HIRF and other disturbances, it is important to study the severity
of these incidents. The results of Section 5 of the study are given in Appendix B. In general, there
was a significant variation in the level of concern among the respondents, as evidenced by the fairly
large standard deviations in each case. Passenger RFI, Onboard RFI and Unknown Source RFI
showed a critically level which averaged "Concern". In the case of Onboard Systems RFI, HIRF, and
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Lightning,theaverage(5.7with astandarddeviationof 3.0)wascloserto "EmergencyProcedures".
Wecan learn moreaboutHIRF criticality if westudythe five pilots who reportedHIRF
incidents(#1,11,15,23,40)in Table6.9. Thesefive pilotsreportedHIRF criticalitiesof 5, 5, 5(10),
5, left blank. Respondent40, did not list any affectedsystemsor criticality level for HIRF.
However,he reportedthat theexternalRFI hewitnessedwasdue to a hand-held(walkie-talkie)
transmitterwhichaffectedoutflowvalues.Perhapsthiswasanincidentwhichoccurredwhenparked
or taxiingandthuswasnotof realconcernsincetheaircraft wasnot in flight. Respondent15listed
a 10for "Tornadodueto VOA", obviouslytheTornadoincidentdiscussedin Sec.3.2. Furthermore
hecommentedonhiscriticality ratingof 5:" brakes,pressurization,etc.,BritishAirwayslearnedto
live with it." Clearly this referredto the British Airwaysexperiencesdiscussedin Sec.3.2. In
s.ummary,respondents(#1,11,15,23,40)wereremarkablyconsistentin their ratingof criticality, 5,
whichagreedwell with themeanof 5.7for all therespondents.
7.6 Comparison of HIRF Occurrence Rates with Other Occurrence Rates
As stated in the introduction this report takes a neutral attitude toward the significance and
importance of HIRF. Such decisions are for policy makers. However, in interpreting the results of
this study it is important to compare the results with a few other events related to transportation
safety. In our comparisons we will relate the results of this study and others we use for comparison
purposes to two rate metrics, frequency/flight (or frequency/trip) and frequency per hour, where
one or both of these metrics is available. The results of this study and the comparative rates are given
in Table 7.3. In Table 7.3 the RFI results of this study are compared with fatality rates for various
modes of transportation and other events. These rates were chosen because they are transportation
related, and are available. We must remember that RFI does not in general cause fatalities, (remember
the criticality ratings of Sec. 7.5), thus the RFI values should be multiplied by the percentage of RFI
event which result in fatalities for direct comparison. Unfortunately this value is not available. An
alternative would be to compare the RFI values with other similar events such as aircraft collision
near misses, automobile severe skids or steering and braking system failures. Again these values are
not readily available. The reader should be reminded that this was a biased sample (c.f. Sec. 4.2).
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Comparingthe eventsof Table 7.3weseethat the number of RFI events per hour varies
between l0 -3 and 10.4 per hour, and the number of HIRF EMI events per hour varies between l0 4
and 10.5 per hour. Depending on which values we compare, the HIRF EMI rates vary from roughly
equal to all RFI values to about 1/65 of the RFI total. For comparison the fatality rates per hour for
other modes of transportation, (and also disease), range from l0 6 to 10 -7 (except for general aviation
which is 105). Thus, HIRF EMI events occur about 100 times as frequently as transportation
fatalities. Comparison of the frequencies per hour with the frequencies per trip shows that the rates
per trip are 3-30 times greater than those per hour, and much of this is due to average trip length in
hours.
8.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The technique of consensus estimation, the use of an anonymous questionnaire to solicit the
opinion and estimates of experts, has been used to develop data on HIRF EMI. Although HIRF EMI
is an uncommon event, difficult to define, and sometimes shrouded in secrecy for various reasons,
the methodology has worked and revealed basic information about HIRF EMI. Out of the sample of
57 respondents, 5 clearly experienced some form of HIRF EMI (the pilots), and two observed it as
passengers (the engineers). Though the sample is small, the descriptions of the HIRF EMI events are
clear, and along with the anecdotal evidence cited we can conclude that HIRF EMI does occur. The
significance, risk, importance, means of reduction, and other related matters are the purview of policy
makers.
Much can be done to continue the study of HIRF EMI:
• The computations can be repeated to correct for the effects of respondents 21, 57,
and 58.
• A bigger sample can be questioned to increase the number of respondents who have
experienced HIRF EMI.
• One can focus future studies on "high risk" HIRF EMI groups, such as Caribbean Pilots,
Drafted Desert Storm Commercial Pilots, and military pilots.
• Contact can be made with pilots in other countries who may have HIRF EMI experience.
• Relate, through the creation of a larger data base (as suggested above) or via a focused
study, the frequency and consequences of HIRF EMI as a function of the amount of digital
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automationin variousaircraft.
Studythepotential for and mechanisms of HIRF EMI induced safety problems such as those
discussed in Sec. 2.
The various trade-offs involved in shielding fly-by-wire systems compared with using fly-
by-light systems to reduce avionics upsets can be studied [Baker and Pitts, 1992].
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TABLE 6.6
Comparison of Estimated and Calculated Percentages for External EMI
21 Data Sets in
Table 6.5
Mean Estimated 12.5
13 Data Sets with
r>0.61 in Table 6.5
12.1
Mean Calculated 10.3 9.4
Standard Deviation Estimated 15.9 17.5
Standard Deviation Calculated 12.2 13.6
Correlation Between Estimated 0.79 0.83
and Calculated
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TABLE 6.8
Frequency of All Upsets as Observed by Pilots
Response # Upsets/Year
l .
8
11
15
23
24
26
27
34
35
37
38
39
40
44
55
Mean
Standard Deviation
0.20
1.00
0.50
0.21
5.00
0.15
0
2.0
0.16
0
0
0
0.13
' 0.20
0
1.0
0.63
1.32
Upsets/Flight
1.25×10 "a
2.17×10 .3
10,`10 -a
4.4,` 10"a
66,`10 -a
2.1,`10 "a
0
32,`10 -a
0.6,` 10"a
0
0
1.3×10 `3
10.7,,10 -a
, ,m
20.6,, 10a
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TABLE 6.9
Frequencyof HIRF Events- As Observedby Pilots
(Tables6.2and6.8)
Response#
8
11
15
21
23
24
25
26
27
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
44
55
Work
#
Pilot 1
Pilot/Engineer 0
Pilot 2
Pilot/Engineer 4
Pilot/Manager 1
Pilot/Engineer l
Pilot/Engineer 0
Pilot/Engineer 0
Pilot/Engineer 0
Pilot/Engineer 0
Pilot/Engineer 0
Pilot 0
Pilot 0
Pilot 0
Pilot 0
Pilot 0
Pilot l
Pilot 0
Pilot 0
ExternalEMI
ObservationasPilot
Years Flights
25 4000
13 6000
10 500
38 1800
20 1500
20 1400
26 3000
6 370
25 6500
31 ?
26 25,000hrs.
37 3000
30 ?
25 ?
28 ?
2 1536
Frequency
PerYear
.04
0
.20
.11
.05
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
.04
0
0
Frequency
PerFlight
.25×10-3
0
4×10_3
2.2×10 .3
.67×10 -3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Mean .024 0.45×10 3
Standard Deviation .053 1.07×10 3
49
0 _._ o _ _
.o
v
G)
_ o
J_
LL
.o qt
0
i
,i _u
_5
i
_5
l
5O
_v
TABLE 6.11
Frequency of All Events as Observed by Passengers
(From Tables 6.7 and 6.10)
Response #
4
7
10
14
17
19
22
27
30
31
35
42
48
Work
EMI Specialist
)1
vl
)1
))
Iv
• Iv
Pilot/Engineer
EMI Specialist
)1
Pilot
EMI Specialist
vv
External
Observation as Passenger
# Years
or Engineer 2 7
0 30
0 30
2 20
1 25
0 30
3 35
4 4
or Engineer l0 25
0 25
0 31
or Engineer 0 8
0 23
Mean
Standard Deviation
Flights
100
100
5OO
2000
120
20O
120
1000
450
9
2OO
1500
Frequency
Per Year
0.28
0
0
0.10
0.04
0
0.086
1.0
0.4
0
0
0
0
0.15
0.29
Frequency
Per Flight
20× 10"3
0
0
1×10 "a
8.3×10 .3
0
15×10 -a
33.3×10 .3
10×10 -a
0
0
0
0
6.7×10 .3
10.5×I0 -a
TABLE 6.12
Frequency of HIRF Events as Reported by Passengers
(From Sec. 4.3 and Table 6.1 l)
Response #
4
7
l0
14
17
19
22
27
30
31
35
External
Observation as Passenger
Work
# [ Years
EMI Specialist or Engineer
II
tl
Vt
V!
l)
It
Pilot/Engineer
0 7
0 30
0 30
0 20
0 25
1 30
0 35
0 4
Flights
100
100
500
2000
120
2OO
120
Frequency
Per Year
0
0
0
0
0
0.033
0
0
Frequency
Per Flight
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
42
48
EMI Specialist or Engineer
vl
Pilot
EMI Specialist or Engineer
It
Mean
Standard Deviation
25 1000
25 450
31 ?
8 200
23 1500
0
0.12
0
0
0
0.12
0.34
0
6.7×10-3
0
0
0
0.56×10 "3
1.93×10 .3
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TABLE 6.13
Frequencyof All EventsasObservedby Pilots(with r ,_0.60in Table6.5)(FromTable6.8)
Response# Upsets/Year Upsets/Flight
8
15
23
27
34
55
Mean
StandardDeviation
1.00
0.21
5.00
2.0
0.16
1.0
2.17,,10-3
4.4×10"a
6.7×10.3
32.4×10-a
0.61×10-3
1.3×10"3
1.56 7.93×10"a
1.81 12.2×10a
TABLE 6.14
Frequency of All Events as Reported by Passengers
(with r ,_0.6 in Table 6.5)
(From Table 6.11)
Response # Work Upsets/Year Upsets/Flight
14
27
30
_f
Pilot/Engineer
EMI Specialist or Engineer
0.10
1.0
0.4
1×10-a
33.3×10 a
10×10 a
Mean 0.5 14.8× 10"3
0.4Standard Deviation 16.67×10 -3
i,
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Quantity
All EMI Upsets
Observedby Pilots
TABLE 7.1
MeanOccurrenceRatesof VariousEvents
Frequency/Year
0.66
0.25*
1.56"*
Frequency/1000Flights
5.08
2.60"
7.93"*
HIRF Upsets 0.024 0.45
Observedby Pilots
All EMI Upsets 0.15 6.7
Observedby Passengers 0.5** 14.8"*
HIRF Upsets 0.12 0.56
Observedby Passengers
With outliersremoved.
Onlyresponseswith r > 0.61considered
TABLE 7.2
IntervalEstimatesof OccurrenceRatesfor VariousEvents
Quantity Frequency/1000Flights
80%ConfidenceInterval
HIRF Upsets 0.31- 0.76
Observedby Pilots
HIRF Upsets 0.25- 0.93
Observedby Passengers
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TABLE 7.3
OccurrenceRatesfrom ThisStudyandOtherComparativeStudies
Event
All UpsetsPilots1
(Point Estimates)
All Upsets Passengers 2
(Point Estimates)
HIRF Upsets Pilots a
(Point Estimates)
(Interval Estimates)
HIRF Upsets Passengers 4
(Point Estimates)
(Interval Estimates)
Rail Fatalities 5
(Point Estimates)
Bus Fatalities 5
(Point Estimates)
Scheduled Air Fatalities 5
(Point Estimates)
Auto Fatalities 5
(Point Estimates) s
General Aviation Fatalities s
(Point Estimates)
Average Due to Disease 7
(Point Estimates)
Frequency/Hour
0.25 x 10"a
0.66 × 10"a
1.56 x 103
0.15 x 10"3
0.5 × l0 3
0.024 _ 10a
0.007 x I0 -5
0.384 × 10.5
0.209 _ 105
0.166 x 10.5
0.055 x 10"5
3.1 × 10.5
1 × 10-6
Airline Crashes into Mountain ....
in Good Weather and Mechanical
Condition a
1 Table 7.1, assume 1000 exposure hours/year
2 Table 7.1, assume 1000 exposure hours/year
a Table 7.1, 7.2, assume i000 exposure hours/year
4 Table 7.1, 7.2, assume 1000 exposure hours/year
5
6
Frequency/Flight or Trip
2.60 × 10"a
5.08 × 10a
7.93 _ l0 "a
6.7 × 10"a
14.8 × 10"a
0.45 _ 10a
0.31-0.76 × 10a
0.56 × 10"a
0.25-0.93 × 10-a
0.014 × 10-5
0.'J68 × 10.5
0.627 _ 10-5
0.111 × 105
9.3 × 10"5
1.25-5.6 x 10 .7
Shooman, Table J-3, p. 630, based on a NYC to Washington DC "average trip"
Department of Transportation, May 1988, assume 10,000 miles driven/year and an average
of 25 mph. = 400 hr./year
Shooman, Fig. J-l, p. 624 "average trip"
Fragola and Shooman, 1992
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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE AND MAILING TO THE PARTICIPANTS
The following 16 page questionnaire was sent to the respondents along with the cover letter dated on
May 4, 1992.
A copy of the reminder letter, dated August 12, 1992, and sent to participants to encourage additional
responses is included.
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Route 110, Farmingdale, New York 11735 516-755-4400/FAX 5167554404
SCHOOL OF
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING
AND COMPUTER SCIENCE
516-755-4290
May 4, 1992
Polytechnic
Dr. Martin L. Shooman u N I V E R S I T Y
Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Polytechnic University - Long Island Campus
Route 110
Farmingdale, NY I ! 735
UNEXPLAINED AIRCRAFT UPSET QUESTIONNAIRE
INTRODUCTION:
Dear Professional:
Your are being asked to participate in an important data collection effort on Aircraft Safety. In recent years, many
anecdotal reports (stories) have appeared regarding the upset (disruption) of avionics systems. I am presently working
to collect data on the frequency, nature, and severity of such interrupt events under a NASA Grant. This data will
be used to help determine if further study is needed and to _ssign research priorities. Some of these events have been
previously studied or are well known, e.g. lightning, interference of passenger electronics equipment. However, the
effects and importance of system failures due to malfunctions and external radio interference (sometimes called High
Intensity Radio Frequency Interference, HIRF) are less well studied.
1 am sure you appreciate that some of this information is considered sensitive or proprietary by manufacturers,
airlines, and others. In addition some of the suspected sources of interference are military or covert activities. Thus,
it was decided to use an "Anonymous Expert Questionnaire" to develop some of this data. No names will appear in
the reporting of this data and the sources will only be described as to the numbers or percentages of airline captains,
avionics engineers, airline maintenance personnel, etc. who responded to the questionnaire.
I would like to acknowledge the help of the following individuals who critiqued this questionnaire and supplied the
names of most of the professionals to whom this was sent:
Joe Fragola, SAIC Rowena Morrison, NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Gerry Fuller, CKC Labs Felix Pitts, NASA Langley
Herbert Hecht, SoHar Inc. Ronald Rogers, Airline Pilots Association
Before completing this questionnaire, please suggest or send copies to other knowledgeable colleagues who should
also complete this questionnaire. (Please read question 8 and make copies if appropriate). Complete and return this
questionnaire even if you know of zero incidents of upsets since this is also valid data. Your cooperation, help, time
and suggestions are much appreciated.
Please send the completed questionnaire to my Secretary, JoAnn McDonald, in the enclosed stamped, self-
addressed envelope, (within two weeks of receipt if possible).
Sincerely,
Martin L. Shooman
New York City:
333 Jay Street
Brooklyn, NY 11201
718-260-3600
FAX 7182603136
Long Island: Westchester:
Route 110 36 Saw Mill River Road
Farmingdale, NY 11735 Hawthorne, NY 10532
516-755-4400 914-347-6940
FAX 5167554404 FAX 9143476939
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1.0 YOUR FIELD OF EXPERTISE
1.1 Your Profession and Employment (Check all that auDly)
[--] Military Pilot
["] Commercial Pilot
["1 NonSched Pilot
['7 Corporate Pilot
["-] Aerospace Engineer
[-7 Physicist
r-] Manager
["] EMI Specialist
[-'] Other (specify)
["] Military Crew Member
['7 Commercial Crew Member
[--] NonSched Crew Member
[-1 Corporate Crew Member
[-1 Electrical Engineer
[-"] Mathematician
• ["] Mechanical Engineer
['-] Government Administrator
F-] Military Aircraft Maintenance
['7 Commercial Aircraft Maintenance
['7 NonSched Aircraft Maintenance
[-'] Corporate Aircraft Maintenance
['-] Airframe manufacturer (military)
["7 Airframe manufacturer (commercial)
['-] Avionics* manufacturer (military)
[-'] Avionics* manufacturer (commercial)
* Avionics includes instrumentation, navigation, control, etc.
1.2 Total Years of Experience in Your Field:
[-'] > 30 years [-'] > 20 years [-'] > 10 years ['7 • 5 years
[--] Other (specify)
['7 > I year
1.3 Types of Aircraft Associated with Your Professional Experlenff:
Commercial
['7 Wide Body
[-1 Business Jets
[--] Airship
[-1 Other (specify).
['7 Narrow Body ['-] Feeder Jets ['7 Regional Jets
[-'i Heavy Twin Turboprop ['-] Light Twin Turboprop
[--] Single Engine Turboprop [-1 Helicopter
Military
r-] Fighter
[-'] Transport
['-] Other (specify)
['7 Recon [--] Bomber [7 Fighter/Bomber
['-] Tanker [-'] Airship ['7 Helicopter
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Commercial
[-'] A300 [--] A310
I-1747-,00D 707-720
['7 767 ['] 777
D 727-LONG_ MD-80
["1 DC-60 ["1 DC-SUPER 70
["1 Airship
["1 Other (specify).
[-'] A320 D A330 ['1 A340
D 747-200,300 D 747-SP D 747-400
D 737-200,300 F'] 737-400 D 737-500
MD-!1 D MD-90 _ DC-8
F'l DC-9,10,20 r] DC-30,40 [-'] LI011
F'l Helicopter
['7 A300-600
D 757
["']727-STD
_'] DC-10
I aU!a.OL, I
['-] Cessna Citation I
F'] Gates Lear jet 25D,256
["] Gulfstream 1I
D Gulfstream IV
['-1 Other (specify)
[_ Cessna Citation II
[-] Gates Lear jet 35,36A
D Gulf stream liB
D Beech Jet 400 II
F'] Cessna Citation III
[-1 Gates Lear jet 55
[--] Gulfstream III
['] Beech Jet 400 I!I
Tur_krD__e_  
D Beech Airliner C-99
rl Beech King Air F90-1
[--1 Piper Mojave
D Piper T-1020
F'! Cessna Twin Utiliner 402C
["1 Other (specify)_
Military/Government
D F-Ill E] F-14
D C-SAIB E! B-52
['] Other (specify)
D Beech 1900c
["-]Beech Super 200,B200
D Piper400LS CLEY IliA
[7 PiperT- 1040
D Cessna-Chancellor
['7 Fairchild Metro II! & V
[--] Piper Chieftain
D Piper Seneca
[-'] Cessna Twin Conquest II
D Cessna 421
[_ F-18 [--] Helicopter
[-'] B-! [-] Airship
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2.0 FREQUENCY OF AVIONICS UPSETS t" (Check all that apply)
* The term upset is defined to mean any significant deviation from expected behavior which is more than a
nuisance and might compromise aspects of the flight.
2.1 Freauen¢_ of Unsets:
Estimate the number of incidents, and the numbers of years and flights to the best of your ability. If you
have no.__!observed any such upsets enter 0 as the number of incidents since 0 incidents is important data.
F] Personal Observation as a pilot
r] Number of incidents ["1 Over __ years [7 Covering __ flights
r] Personal observation as a crew member
['1 Number of incidents ["1 Over
r--] Personal observation as a passenger
D Number of incidents ["] Over
__ years ['-] Covering flights
years r] Covering __ flights
r--] Conversations with others who were personal observers
["1 Number of incidents [-'] Over years [-'] Covering __ flights
[--1 Study of data or reports
[7 Number of incidents ['7 Over _ years [7 Covering _ flights
["1 Study of anecdotal (stories) accounts
[-1 Number of incidents [--] Over
I"-! Other
__ years ["] Covering _ flights
2.2 _craft Affected by Upse.,t. Incidents (Check all that aDDI_:
Commercial
r--] Wide Body
[-1 Business Jets
["] Airship
[-1 Other (specify)
I'-I Narrow Body
['1 Heavy Twin Turboprop
[7 tIelicopter
r-i Feeder Jets r] Regional Jets
[-1 Light Twin Turboprop
I--I Single Engine Turboprop
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Military
['7 Fighter
['7 Transport
D Other (specify)
[-'l Recon ["] Bomber ['7 Fighter/Bomber
[--] Tanker [--] Helicopter D Airship
2.3 Specific Aircraft Affected bv Upset Incidents {Check all that atmlv):
Commercial
['-] A300 ['7 A310 ['7 A320 F7 A330
[-] 747-100 ["1 707-720 !"1 747-200,300 ['] 747-SP
[7 767 [-] 777 [-] 737-200,300 ['-] 737-400
['-] 727-LONC__ MD-80 ['7 MD-!! ['7 MD-90
['7 DC-60 ["1 DC-SUPER 70 [7 DC-9,10,20 [7 DC-30,40
[7 Airship [-'] Helicopter
[-1 Other (specify).
["] A340
[-1 747-400
[-'] 737-500
[--I DC-8
['-I LI01 !
['7 A300-600
['7 757
["1 727-STD
['-] DC-10
Bp_iness Jet
[-] Cessna Citation I
["] Gates Lear jet 25D,256
[--] Gulf stream II
['7 Gulf stream IV
[7 Other (specify)
[-'l Cessna Citation I1
['-] Gates Lear jet 35,36A
['-] Gulf stream liB
I'-] Beech .let 400 II
["] Cessna Citation Ill
['] Gates Lear jet 55
I"1 Gulfstream III
[--] Beech Jet 400 Iii
Turbo Prop
["] Beech Airliner C-99
[-'[ Beech King Air F90-!
[-'] Piper Mojave
[7 Piper T-1020
[7 Cessna Twin Utiliner 402C
l-'] Other (specify)
["] Beech !900C
['-] Beech Super 200,B200
[7 Piper 400LS CLEY IliA
["] Piper T- 1040
[-'] Cessna-Chancellor
F] Fairchild Metro 111 & V
[-'] Piper Chieftain
["] Piper Seneca
["] Cessna Twin Conquest II
[-'] Cessna 421
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Militarv/Governmen|
OF-Ill I-'1r-14
I-'1C-SAIB OB-52
['7 Other (specify)
["'] F-18 [-"] Helicopter.
['-] B-I [-"1 Airship.
IF YOU HAVE EXPERIENCED 0 UPSETS OF ANY KIND PLEASE SKIP TO QUESTION 7,
3.0 CONDITION UNDERWHICH UPSETS OCCUR
3.1 Do Such UDset_ Oc¢ur on:
[-1 Landing
r] Taxing
["1 Low-level Flight
[-1 Other (specify)
["-] Takeoff ['-1 Straight and level Flight
['7 Parked [-'] Don't know
[-'] Flight Maneuvers ["1 Low Traffic
D Ascent ['-1 Descent
["'] Formation Flight
["l High Traffic
3.2 Under What Weather Conditions"
["'] Clear, good visibility [-'] Cloudy, medium visibility
[-'] Clouds or Rain*, Poor Visibility D Not significant
['] Hot ['7 Cold
['-] Other (specify)
['7 Rain*, medium visibility
["l Don't know
* Or other precipitation
3.3 Level of Avionics Maintenance When Upsets Occurred:
[-'] Good condition [-'[ Needed servicing ['7 Under service r-] problems with a particular unit
[--] Not significant ["7 Don't know ["1 Design problem with a particular subsystem
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WE WISH MORE DETAILS ON THE NATURE OF THE UPSETS YOU REPORTED IN OUESTION 2.0.
pLEASE COMPLETE QUESTIONS 4 AND _ TO THE BEST OF YOUR ABILITY FOR ALL THE
INCIDENTS YOU REMEMBER,
4.0 CAUSE AND EFFECT OF UPSET
4.1 PassenEer RFI*
*Radio frequency interference affecting an aircraft system caused by passenger equipment operating inside
the aircraft
[-'l FM Radio
[--] Tape player/recorder
Source:
['7 AM Radio
'"]Computer
[-1 Unknown or difficult to determine source
[-'] Other (specify)
[-'l Short Wave Radio ["1 Transmitter
[--] CD Player [--] Air to Ground Phone
How sure are you of the source of upset? Circle appropriate number:
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
• ..,,.°°..,.,*.°. ,,.°...°.... ,o, °°* °° *.,. °,,..°, *,,... ,..-, ............. ..*..-. .......... , ...................... • ....... *,.-_,,°,..*. ........ • .........................................................
0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I0
llow do you know the source?
System or subsystem affected:
[7 Autopilot ['] Panel Lights
I--] Navigation equipment [7 Flaps
[--] Engine Controls
[-'] Window Heat
[-1 Rudder
['] Other (specify)
[--'] Cabin Lights
D Spoilers
[-'] Rotor ControlsF'I Instrumentation
[-'] Intercom r-] Ailerons
r] Elevators
[-1 Communications Equipment
['-I Landing Gear (Auto Braking/Anti Skid)
[-'] Airship Gas Lift Controls
I--] Cabin Pressure & Temperature
["1 Nose Wheel Steering
ltow sure are you of the affected system or subsystem? Circle appropriate number:
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
.**.,,.,, °.,..,,.. °,,,,,,,, ,., ,,° °,, .° ............................ , ............ , ....... . ............................... ,,., ...............................................................................
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
How do you know the system/subsystem?
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4.20nbonrd RFI**
* * Radio frequency interference caused by one on board system affecting the operation of another on board
system.
Source:
["] VHF-UHF Transmitter Ill High Frequency Transmitter
["] Countermeasures Equipment ["1 Power Source
[-"] Navigation Equipment [-'l Computer
["1 Other (specify).
I-'] Radar
-']Intercom
['-] Unknown
How sure are you of the source of upset? Circle appropriate number:
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
............. ..,, o..,.........,o ........ .°.,. .................... ° ......... . ......... ,.. ............... .°°. ......... °o.°.,,, ........... ..°.o ......... ,. o°. °.° .., .° ..oo _o.o,. o.....° ................... ..
0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 g 9 I0
How do you know the source?
System or subsystem affected:
Ill Autopilot
[--] Communications Equipment
['7 Spoilers
[-1 Helicopter Rotor Controls
['-I Other (specify)
[-'l Panel Lights
r] Navigation equipment
['] Automated Landing Gear
[-7 Airship Gas Lift controls
[-1 Cabin Lights
['-] Flaps
[--'] Engine Controls
D Instrumentation
How sure are you of the affected system or subsystem? Circle appropriate number:
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
............... • ., .°° ...... ,°. ......... .,..°o..., t°...° ......... ..,o,. ........... , ....... °..,° ........ "'° -*.,°.., • .......... ,..,°.°,o ....... - ..°,,-.o .°° ....°, o. H.o .°° .°..°,. o...,, ,p.... °°°.,°.
0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I0
flow do you know the system/subsystem?
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4.3 _LC_ltlLR.F_* * *
• ** Radio frequency interference from a source outside the aircraft (another aircraft, a ship, a ground
installation, etc.) which affects systems within the aircraft (often called HIRF).
Source:
['] Commercial AM Transmitter
['7 Voice of America Transmitter
['-] Military Radar
D Landbased military radar
r-] Hand-held (Walkie-Talkies)
[-'] Air Mobile Transmitter
[--'] Other (specify)
[-'] Commercial FM Transmitter
['-I Air Traffic Control Radar
[7 Shipboard military radar
[..1 Unknown
['-I Airport Fixed Transmitter
['-I Commercial Short Wave Transmitter
["] Weather Radar
[-'] Airborne military radar
['7 VLF/LF Transmitter
["] Car Mobile Transmitter
How sure are you of the source of upset? Circle appropriate number:
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
...,,,,,,,., ...... ,.,., .............. .. .......................... .. ........................................... , ...................................... ,... ....... ,°.°.,,, ...... o ...... .. ..................
0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I0
How do you know the source?
System or subsystem affected:
[-1 Autopilot
['7 Communications Equipment
['7 Spoilers
[--] Helicopter Rotor Controls
["1 Other
['7 Panel Lights
["'] Navigation equipment
['-1 Automated Landing Gear
['7 Airship Gas Lift controls
[-'] Cabin Lights
[--1 Flaps
['-I Engine Controls
['-] Instrumentation
How sure are you of the affected system or subsystem? Circle the appropriate number:
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
................... , ..................... °,,,,,, ............................................................................. -o...,., ............... ,,., ........... . ............ ,, ........................
0 ! 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
How do you know the system/subsystem?
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4.4 LIEhtn|ng
Source:
[-1 Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)
['7 Strike-lndirect
["1 Other (specify)
["1 Strike-Airborne
1-1 St Elmo's Fire
["I Strike-Ground
How sure are you of the source of upset? Circle the appropriate number:
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
........... ° ............. ...,.,., ................. ,, .................. .,. ............. . .......................................... **.o.,, ......... ,, ....... . ........... , ................ , ................ .
0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
How do you know the source?
System or subsystem affected:
I-"] Autopilot
[-] Communications Equipment
['7 Spoilers
]--'] Helicopter Rotor Controls
]-'] Other (specify)
I-'] Panel Lights
1-'] Navigation equipment
[] Automated Landing Gear
]'] Airship Gas Lift controls
['7 Cabin Lights
I="] Flaps
['-1 Engine Controls
'"]Instrumentation
How sure are you of the affected system or subsystem? Circle the appropriate number:
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
............................................................................ . ....... ..,. ............................................................... , ... ,....., ........... , ,** ...... ,,.,, .,.., ........ ,
0 ! 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
flow do you know the system/subsystem?
4.5 EauiDment Failure
Source:
[7 Intermittent
["] Other
I-'] Transient ["1 Hard Failures [-1 Electrostatic Discharge
How sure are you of the sources? Circle the appropriate number:
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
......................................... o * ....... , ................... ,,..... ...... , .......... .., ......... °,,, ...... , ........................... . ...... ,,. *°. ,*. • ....... .. • ................... ... ........
0 ! 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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How do you know the source?
System or subsystem affected:
['7 Autopilot
["] Communications Equipment
[7 Spoilers
[-1 Helicopter Rotor Controls
[-"] Other (specify)
[-"] Panel Lights
r'-] Navigation equipment
["1 Automated Landing Gear
[-'] Airship Gas Lift controls
['1 Cabin Lights
[--I Flaps
r-] Engine Controls
I-'l Instrumentation
How sure are you of the affected system or subsystem? Circle the appropriate number:
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
.n..°..°o..o..o,..°.o....°°.°......... ....... .,.°.,.°.,°°°.°°,,.°°.,.°,..°.o°..,.°°°°.. .......... * ................. .°.,...,,o°,.°.°o. ....................................................................
0 ! 2 3 4 5 6 7 g 9 10
How do you know the system/subsystem?
4.6 Unknown Source
System or subsystem affected:
[7 Autopilot
[7 Communications Equipment
["] Spoilers
[-1 Helicopter Rotor Controls
I'-I Other (specify)
[-'l Panel Lights
[7 Navigation equipment
I-"i Automated Landing Gear
["-] Airship Gas Lift controls
[7 Cabin Lights
[-'] Flaps
D Engine Controls
'-]Instrumentation
flow sure are you of the affected system or subsystem? Circle the appropriate number:
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
. .................. °,.,,,,o°..°°.°.,°°. .................. ,,°.....,.....,,o...o.°..o..°°.°.,.,..,...,..o..,.° ....... , ............. ,,,,,,.°,°,°..°°,.°°°.°°°.°..,.,.,. ......................................
0 ! 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
How do you know the system/subsystem?
4.7 Cause of Upse!
Estimate What Percentage of All the Upsets are Due to:
Passenger RFI Lighting
Onboard RFI Equipment Failure
External RFI Unknown Source
Other (specify)
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CRITICALLY OF UPSETS
liow Critical Are The Upsets Due to Passenger RFI:
Normal Nuisance Concern Emergency Injuries Catutrophlc
.................................................................................................... Procedures D_mege Total Loss
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
5.20nboard Systems RFi
How Critical Are The Upsets Due to Onboard RFI:
Normal Nuisance Concern
Emergency InJurles Cetasb-ophlc
Procedures Damage Total Loss
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
5.3 E__xternal RFI (HIRF)
tlow Critical Are The Upsets Due to External RFI (ltIRF):
Normal Nuisance Concern Emergency
Procedures
5.4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Injuries Catastrophic
Damage Total Loss
7 8 9 10
tlow Critical Are The Upsets Due to Lighting:
Normal Nuisance Concern
Emergency Injuries Catastrophic
Procedures Damage Total Loss
7 8 g tO0 t 2 3 4 5 6
5.5 Avionics Euuipment Failurf
itow Critical Are The Upsets Due to Avionics Equipment Failure:
Normal Nuisance Concern Emergency Injuries Catas_ophlc
Procedures Damage Total Loss
0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
5.6 Unknown Source
How Critical Are The Upsets Due to Unknown Sources:
Normal Nuisance Concern Emergency
Procedures
Injuries Catastrophic
Damage Total Lose
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 g 10
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6.0 DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS
Now that you have reported on overall aspects of avionics upsets you are asked to give more specific details of
such incidents. Please focus on those you think were most significant.
6.1 If sou have detailed knowledge of any unset events nlease describe them below:
My descriptions are based on:
[-'] Personal Observation
[-'] Reliable and detailed report from a second party
['-] Study of data based on reliable reports of observers
I'] Other (specify)
["] Don't have detailed information
6.2 Please give a brif( description of the events, includinR aircraft, flight condition, airport or IQcation,
weather, mainte-*nce conditions, source of unset, how determined, effect, severily, criticality, etc.):
Event !:
Event 2:
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Event 3:
(Please use additional sheets if more room is needed for more details or additional events.)
["] Additional sheets attached.
WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO COMPILE A LIST OF PUBLISHED REPORTS AND ARTICLES ABOUT UPSET£
7.0 IlAVE YOU SEEN FREQUENCYOR SEVERITY DATA REPORTED ON UPSET EVENTS DUE TO?
7.t aP_as.s._._REI
Source of data:
Person/Organization to Contact for more details:
Articles/Reports in the literature with data:
7.20nboard RFI
Source of data:
Person/Organization to Contact for more details:
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Articles/Reportsin the literature with data:
7.3
Source of data:
Person/Organization to Contact for more details:
Articles/Reports in the literature with data:
7.4 LIEhtnint
Source of data:
Person/Organization to Contact for more details:
Articles/Reports inthe literature with data:
z
7O
7.5 Avionics Equipment Failure
Source of data:
Person/Organization to Contact for more details:
Articles/Reports in the literature with data:
8.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
g.I Who else has information on ¢lviQnlcs upsets and should be sent a copy of this form and asked to respond?
r] i have made copies of this form and sent it to colleagues for their completion.
71 Shooman please send copies to the following individuals:
Contact !:
Contact 2:
Contact 3:
(Please use additional sheets if more room is needed for more details or additional events.)
r] Additional sheets attached.
71
8.2 _dditional (_ommcnts
TIIANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND HELP IN CONTRIBUTING
TO THIS IMPORTANT STUDY OF AIRCRAFT SAFETY
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Route 110, Farmingdale, New York 11735 516-755-4400/FAX5167554404
SCHOOL OF
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING
AND COMPUTER SCIENCE
Computer Science Department
516/755-4290
E-MAIL: shooman@prism.poly.ed u
August 12, 1992
Dear Participant:
Some time ago I sent you a copy ota questionnaire requestingyour experiences concerning the frequency and
effects of radio frequency interference on aircraft systems.
If you have not filled out the form and responded, I would appreciate it if you could take some time to
complete and return the form. Your response would be much appreciated, even if you have never observed
this phenomena.
Very truly yours,
Martin L. Shooman
Professor of Electrical Engineering
and Computer Science
MLS/jam
New York City: Long Island: Westchester:
333 Jay Street Route 110 36 Saw Mill River Road
Brooklyn, NY 11201 Farmingdale, NY 11735 Hawthorne, NY 10532
718-260-3600 516-755-4400 914-347-6940
FAX 7182603136 FAX 5167554404 FAX 9143476939
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APPENDIX B
EXPERIENCE DATA
The information for many Of the questions on the questionnaire can be summarized by adding
all the responses for the 57 respondents. Rather than create a large set of tables, the data was listed
on a copy of the response form which follows in this appendix. The total number of responses are
listed to the left of each item. Clearly, there are more responses than 57. For example respondent
#1 checked: military pilot, commercial pilot, aerospace engineer, manager, and mechanical engineer
in response to question 1.1.
For question 1.1, seven "other" responses were received and are listed on the last line for this
section. The notation FAA [2] means that two respondents said they worked for the FAA during
some portion of their career. Brackets were used to indicate multiple responses for other questions
as well.
In section 4.1 twelve sources were checked, with unknown accounting for five of these
responses. Only eightrespondents checked a number under "how sure are you of the source of upset":
7,10,7,10,0,0,1,7. The average was 5.3 and the standard deviation 4.3. In some cases respondents
checked more than one source and circled an "average surety" or checked one or more sources but left
blank the question on surety. Similar comments hold for the other subsections of Sec. 4.0 and 5.0.
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1.0 YOURFIELD OFEXPERTISE
1.1 Yqpr Profession anO Employment (Check all that anply)
10 Military Pilot 0 Military Crew Member 0 Military Aircraft Maintenance
13 Commercial Pilot 2 Commercial Crew Member 1 Commercial Aircraft Maintenance
2 NonSched Pilot 0 NonSched Crew Member 1 NonSched Aircraft Maintenance
4 Corporate Pilot 0 Corporate Crew Member 2 Corporate Aircraft Maintenance
10 Aerospace Engineer 22 Electrical Engineer 4 Airframe manufacturer (military)
4 Physicist 1 Mathematician 7 Airframe manufacturer (commercial)
15 Manager 5 Mechanical Engineer 5 Avionics* manufacturer (military)
15 EMI Specialist 4 Government Administrator 10 Avionics* manufacturer (commercial)
7 Other: Aircraft Components Manufacturer
EMC Consultant
Pilot/Crew Member Flight Testing
NASA
FAA [21
General Aviation Pilot
* Avionics includes instrumentation, navigation, control, etc.
1.2 Total Years 9f Exnerience in YQur Field:
]-'] > 30 years ["] > 20 years [-1 > 10 years D > 5 years
[-1 Other (specify)
[==] > 1 year
1.3 Tvnes of Aircraft Associated with Your Professional Exeerlence"
Commercial
27 Wide Body
19 Business Jets
0 Airship
8 Other:
Military
21 Narrow Body 4 Feeder Jets
10 Heavy Twin Turboprop 9 Light Twin Turboprop
7 Single Engine Turboprop 10 Helicopter
IC Engine Prop. Driven
Single Engine Piston
CV 440
L- 188 (Electra)
I)C-9
B727
Cessna 310
Cessna Aero Commander
20
17
Fighter
Transport
Other: Trainer [2]
PPV
10 Recon
8 Tanker
13 Bomber
0 Airship
7 Regional Jets
14 Fighter/Bomber
10 Helicopter
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Commercial
6 A300 5 A310 5 A320 4 A330 3 A340 2 A300-600
II 747-I00 9 707-720 I0 74%200,300 8 747-SP 5 747-400 4757
12 767 6 777 4 737-200,300 4 737-400 4 737-500 II 727-STD
12 727-LONG 8 MD-80 7 MD-II 2 MD-90 I DC-8 4D C-10
0 DC-60 I DC-SUPER 70 9 DC-9,10,20 2 DC-30,40 12 LI011
2 Airship 600 [2! , 7 Helicopter MBX,206,212,412,214. helicopter [2l
15 Other (specify)
Business Jet
5 Cessna Citation I
5 Gates Lear jet 25D.256
4 Gulfstream H
7 Gulfstream IV
18 Other (specify)
7 Cessna Citation II
6 Gates Lear jet 35,36A
2 Gulf stream IIB
5 Beech Jet 400 II
9 Cessna Citation Ill
3 Gates Lear jet 55
3 Gulf stream III
5 Beech Jet 400 III
Turbo Proo
3 Beech Airliner C-99
3 Beech King Air F90-1
2 Piper Mojave
2 Piper T- 1020
2 Cessna Twin Utiliner 402C
21 Other (specify),
4 Beech 1900C
7 Beech Super 200.B200
3 Piper 400LS CLEY IIIA
3 Piper T- 1040
3 Cessna-Chancellor
4 Fairchild Metro III & V
2 Piper Chieftain
3 Piper Seneca
2 Cessna Twin Conquest II
2 Cessna 421
MilitarY/Government
3F-Ill
2 C-5AIB
69 Other (specify)
5 F-i4
2 B-52
8 F- 18 9 Helicopter
5 B-1 0 Airship.
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2.0 FREQUENCY OF AVIONICS UPSETS* (Check all that apply)
* The term upset is defined to mean any significant deviation from expected behavior which is more than a
nuisance and might compromise aspects of the flight.
2.1 Freauency of Unse(_:
Estimate the number of incidents, and the numbers of years and flights to the best of your ability. If you have
not observed any such upsets enter 0 as the number of incidents since 0 incidents is important data.
[-1 Personal Observation as a pilot
F=] Number of incidents _ [-1 Over _ years _ flights
-]Personal observation as a crew member
[-1 Number of incidents [-1 Over
-]Personal observation as a passenger
Ill Number of incidents ['7 Over
['7 Covering
years ["] Covering __ flights
_. years F] Covering _ flights
["1 Conversations with others who were personal observers
[-1 Number of incidents __ F'] Over _ years
1"1 Study of data or reports
I'-] Number of incidents
["] Covering _ flights
[-1 Over __ years [--] Covering __ flights
['-] Study of anecdotal (stories) accounts
["1 Number of incidents [-'] Over
["] Other
years [--] Covering __ flights
2.2 Tynes of Aircraft Affected by Unset Incidents (Check all that anlflv):
Commercial
15 Wide Body
7 Business Jets
2 Airship
14 Narrow Body
8 Heavy Twin Turboprop
5 Helicopter
2 Feeder Jets 4 Regional Jets
3 Light Twin Turboprop
3 Single Engine Turboprop
3 Other Single Engine Piston [2], Confidential
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Military
9 Fighter 2 Recon 3 Bomber
5 Transport 2 Tanker 5 Helicopter
3 Other: Space Shuttle, Special Purpose Transport, Trainer
5 Fighter/Bomber
0 Airship
2.3 SDeclflc Aircraft Affected by Ueset Incidents (Check all that al_Dl¥):
Commercial
2 A300 1 A310 1 A320 0 A330
6 747-100 3 707-720 4 747-200,300 1 747-SP
3 767 0 777 2 737-200,300 0 737-400
5 727-LONG 6 MD-80 1 MD-I 1 0 MD-90
0 DC-60 0 DC-SUPER 70 5 DC-9,10,20 0 DC-30,40
2 Airship 3 Helicopter
0 A340
0 747-400
0 737-500
2DC-8
7 L1011
0 A300-600
2 757
4 727-STD
3 DC-10
5 Other: CV5g0, CV440, Fan Trainer, Diamona, SF-25C
1 Cessna Citation I
1 Gates Lear jet 25D,256
2 Gulf stream II
0 Gulf stream IV
1 Cessna Citation II
1 Gates Lear jet 35,36A
0 Gulfstream IIB
0 Beech Jet 400 II
3 Cessna Citation III
0 Gates Lear jet 55
0 Gulfstream lIl
0 Beech Jet 400 III
3 Other. Cessna Citation V, BA-125-800, Falcon 900
1 Beech Airliner C-99
1 Beech King Air F90-1
1 Piper Mojave
0 Piper T-1020
0 Cessna Twin Utiliner 402C
0 Beech 1900C
0 Beech Super 200,B200
0 Piper 400LS CLEY IIIA
0 Piper T- 1040
0 Cessna-Chancellor
1 Fairchild Metro IIl& V
1 Piper Chieftain
0 Piper Seneca
1 Cessna Twin Conquest II
0 Cessna 421
7 Other: Pilatus PC=9, Piper Malibu (Piston), Beechcraft Bonanza, CU580, ATR43, Dash8, 5340
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Military/Govern men t
2F-Ill
1 C-5AIB
15 Other:
l F-14 4 F-18 7 Helicopter Bl_tckh_wk, Aooache. helicooter r51
2 B-52 3 B-I 0 Airship.
A-7, C- 130 [2], Army RC- 12 Series, Tornado [3], F- 15, OV- 1D, T-37, T- 38, C- 17, Classified, F- 16,
F-4
3.0
3.1
IF YOU HAVE EXPERIENCED 0 UPSETS OF ANY KIND PLEASE SKIP TO OUESTION 7.
CONDITION UNDER WHICH UPSETS OCCUR
D9 _pch Upsets Occur on:
6 Landing
4 Taxing
5 Low-level Flight
7 Takeoff
7 Parked
4 Flight Maneuvers
$ Other
18 Straight and level Flight
0 Don't know
2 Low Traffic
8 Ascent 11 Descent
0 Formation Flight
I High Traffic
Earth orbit, ground checkout, EMC test program, cloud penetrations, any condition [2], helicopter
ground run [2]
3.2 Under What Weather Conditions:
3.3
16 Clear, good visibility
9 Clouds or Rain*, Poor Visibility
1 Hot
3 Cloudy, medium visibility
11 Not significant
1 Cold
2 Other: ENC Test program, not important except for lightening
* Or other precipitation
5 Rain*, medium visibility
2 Don't know
Level of Avionics Maintenance When Upsets Occurred:
17 Good condition 0 Needed servicing 0 Under service 3 Problems with a particular unit
3 Not significant 3 Don't know 9 Design problem with a particular subsystem
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WE WISH MORE DETAILS ON THE NATURE OF THE UPSETS YOU REPORTED IN OUESTION 2.0.
pLEASE COMPLETE OUESTIONS 4 AND 5 TO THE BEST OF YOUR ABILITY FOR ALL THE INCIDENT_
YOU REMEMBER.
4.0 CAUSE AND EFFECT OF UPSET
4.1 .h_ll._to£g.r._L_ *
• Radio frequency interference affecting an aircraft system caused by passenger equipment operating inside the
aircraft.
Source:
1 AM Radio 0 FM Radio
1 Computer 0 Tape player/recorder
5 Unknown or difficult to determine source
1 Other. Ground Sources
1 Short Wave Radio
0 CD Player
1 Transmitter
2 Air to Ground Phone
How sure are you of the source of upset? Circle appropriate number:. 7,10,7,10,0,0,1,7:
Average = 5.3
Standard Deviation = 4.3
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
..... .o._..o.o,.ooo.oo .oo ).. ooo )o oo, m .oo .._oo,.N* ............. o.... _ .o _oo...°....oo.°. n.._ .,..o +.° *. _°. .......... n*_*. ). ).o_°o ....... ooo ....... • ...............
0 I "2 3 4 5 6 7 g 9 I0
How do you know the source?
System or subsystem affected:
3 Autopilot
4 Navigation equipment
0 Engine Controls
0 Window Heat
0 Rudder
1 Other: Radio
0 Panel Lights
0 Flaps
0 Rotor Controls
l Intercom
0 Elevators
0 Cabin Lights
0 Spoilers
2 Instrumentation
0 Ailerons
0 Hose Wheel Steering
2 Communications Equipment
0 Landing Gear (Auto Braking/Anti Skid)
0 Airship Gas Lift Controls
1 Cabin Pressure & Temperature
How sure are you of the affected system or subsystem? Circle appropriate number:. 10,10,9,10,10,0,2,10:
Average = 7.6
Standard Deviation = 4.1
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
How do you know the system/subsystem? Saw ond heard oxygen masks deployed
8O
4.2 QnbQard RFI**
** Radio frequency interference caused by one on board system affecting the operation of another on board system.
Source:
14 VHF-UHF Transmitter
7 Countermeasures Equipment
5 Navigation Equipment
7 Other (specify)
13 High Frequency Transmitter
5 Power Source
4 Computer
9 Radar
2 Intercom
4 Unknown
How sure are you of the source of upset? Circle appropriate number:. 9,10,10,10,10,7,10,10,7,10,9,10,10,
10,6,10,10,10,9,10,10,10,0,3,9,9,10,10,
Average = 8.8
Standard Deviation - 2.4
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
How do you know the source?.
System or subsystem affected:
9 Autopilot
19 Communications Equipment
0 Spoilers
1 Helicopter Rotor Controls
7 Other (specify)
0 Panel Lights
14 Navigation equipment
0 Automated Landing Gear
0 Airship Gas Lift controls
0 Cabin Lights
0 Flaps
2 Engine Controls
10 Instrumentation
How sure are you of the affected system or subsystem? Circle appropriate number:. 9,9,10,6,10,10,9,10,9,10,10,6,
10,10,10,10,10,10,0,3,9,10,10,10:
Average = 8.8
Standard Deviation = 2.5
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
How do you know the system/subsystem?
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4.3 Tf,xlgLugLR]_* **
*** Radio frequency interference from a source outside the aircraft (another aircraft, a
installation, etc.) which affects systems within the aircraft (often called HIRF).
ship, a ground
Source:
1 Commercial AM Transmitter
6 Voice of America Transmitter
6 Military Radar
2 Landbased military radar
2 Hand-held (Walkie-Talkies)
0 Air Mobile Transmitter
3 Commercial FM Transmitter
1 Air Traffic Control Radar
5 Shipboard military radar
0 Unknown
0 Airport Fixed Transmitter
3 Other:. ECM and Jammer Equipment, Confidential reports
2 Commercial Short Wave Transmitter
0 Weather Radar
l Airborne military radar
0 VLF/LF Transmitter
0 Car Mobile Transmitter
How sure are you of the source of upset?
Average - 8.9
Standard Deviation = 1.9
Circle appropriate number:. 7,10,10,10,4,8,10,10,10,10,6,9,10,10:
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 lO
How do you know the source?
System or subsystem affected:
4 Autopilot
6 Communications Equipment
0 Spoilers
3 Helicopter Rotor Controls
0 Other
I Panel Lights
4 Navigation equipment
2 Automated Landing Gear
0 Airship Gas Lift controls
0 Cabin Lights
0 Flaps
4 Engine Controls
4 Instrumentation
±
How sure are you of the affected system or subsystem? Circle the appropriate number:. 10,10,10,3,10,10,10,6,10,10,
10: Average = 9.0
Standard Deviation = 2.3
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
How do you know the system/subsystem?
82
4.4 Liehtnin_
Source:
5 Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)
6 Strike-Indirect
Other (specify)
14 Strike-Airborne
5 St. Elmo's Fire
3 Strike-Ground
How sure are you of the source of upset? Circle the appropriate number:. 10,7,6,10,10,9,10,10,7,10, 7,10,10, I0,10,10,
7,10,10,9,10,10,8,10:
Average = 9.2
Standard Deviation = 1.3
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
How do you know the source?
System or subsystem affected:
7 Autopilot
10 Communications Equipment
0 Spoilers
0 Helicopter Rotor Controls
0 Other (specify)
0 Panel Lights
11 Navigation equipment
0 Automated Landing Gear
0 Airship Gas Lift controls
2 Cabin Lights
0 Flaps
2 Engine Controls
9 Instrumentation
How sure are you of the affected system or subsystem? Circle the appropriate number:. 10,6,10,10,7,10,8,10,10,7,9,
10,10,10,10,7,10,10,10,8:
Average = 9.1
StandardDeviation = 1.4
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
........ •"''""""'"""'''' ........ **°*--o*ooooo--°_ =o=*-o=ooo =.o_*_° _,°o.--.o*o.°_m °°° .=_m_o _°o_H,°tm..°°_ _°_ ,,o =._._°_ ..°,,°o,,o_,.o.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
How do you know the system/subsystem?
4.5 EauiDment Fallprf
Source:
9 Intermittent
0 Other
12 Transient 8 Hard Failures 0Electrostatic Discharge
How sure are you of the sources? Circle the appropriate number:. 7,5,8,7,9,10,7,10,10,0,10,8,10,10,3,10,4,7,10,10,6,
10: Average = 7.8
Standard Deviation = 2.8
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
°°°rap°° o°°oooo°o o=_°o.o o.o o,° ,o,o, pH_ o°o_ .,._.°o°, ........ °°°_°°_°m_°_°°°°*_°_I*_°_I_o°_=_-_°_°_°__°_--_m_°_°_=_* °
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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How do you know the source?
System or subsystem affected:
6 Autopilot
6 Communications Equipment
0 Spoilers
1 Helicopter Rotor Controls
Other (specify)
1 Panel Lights
7 Navigation equipment
0 Automated Landing Gear
0 Airship Gas Lift controls
0 Cabin Lights
0 Flaps
7 Engine Controls
9 Instrumentation
How sure are you of the affected system or subsystem? Circle the appropriate number: 7,5,10,7,10,6,10,8, l 0,10,7,3,
10,6,10: Average - 7.9
Standard Deviation ffi 2.3
No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I0
How do you know the system/subsystem?
4.6
System or subsystem affected:
5 Autopilot
5 Communications Equipment
0 Spoilers
0 Helicopter Rotor Controls
I Other:. Flight Controls
2 Panel Lights
4 Navigation equipment
2 Automated Landing Gear
0 Airship Gas Lift controls
0 Cabin Lights
2 Flaps
3 Engine Controls
3 Instrumentation
How sure are you of the affected system or subsystem? Circle the appropriate number:. 9,10,8,9,8,10,6,10:
Average ffi 8.8
Standard Deviation - 1.4
No Idea • Maybe Possibly Probably Certain
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
How do you know the system/subsystem?
4.7
Estimate What Percentage of All the Upsets are Due to:
Passenger RFI
Onboard RFI
External RFI
Other (specify)
Lighting
Equipment Failure
Unknown Source
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5.0 CRITICALLY OF UPSETS
5.1 Passenger RFI
How Critical Are The Upsets Due to Passenger RFI: 4,2,4,3,2,5,2,2,5,4,2:
Average = 3.2
Standard Deviation = 1.3
Normal Nuisance Concern Emergency Injuries _ophic
Procedures Damage Total Loss
.......................................................................................................................................................... tear ...................................... |
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Comment: Could be a lO on a CAT IIIapproach.
5.20nboar_I SYstem_ RF][
How Critical Are The Upsets Due to Onboard RFI: 3,6,3,2,5,2,5,3,5,4,2,4,3,4,2,4,5,2,10,10,2,2,4,5,10,7,5,4,0,10,6:
Average = 4.5
Standard Deviation = 2.6
NormaJ Nuisance Concern Emergency Injuries Cata_ophic
Procedures Damage Total Loss
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
5.3 External RFI (HIRF]
How Critical Are The Upsets Due to External RFI (HIRF): 5,6,5,2,8,5,10,7,2,4,1,10,1,5,10,8,4,10,4,4,10,4:
Average = 5.7
Standard Deviation = 3.0
NocmaJ Nuisance Concern Emergency Injuries Catastrophic
Procedures Damage Tots] Loss
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 O 9 10
5.4
How Critical Are The Upsets Due to Lighting: 6,5,6,2,6,2,6,4,6,6,2,3,5,6,10,8,4,4,4,5,10,8,10,5,4,5,10,7:
Average = 5.7
Standard Deviation = 2.4
NocmaJ Nuisance Concern Emergency Injuries Catastrophic
Procedures Damage ToteJ L.oes
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
5.5 Avionics Euuiement Failure
How Cri tical Are The Upsets Due to Avionics Equipment Failure: 2,6,5,6,5,4,6,5,8,5,2,3,5,1,4,6,2,2,6,4,5,10,8,4,5,
10: Average = 5.0
Standard Deviation = 2.3
Normal Nuisance Concern Emergency InjudN Catastrophic
Procedures Damage Total Loss
................................................................................................. - .... • ................................................... mmmmmunr............................... !
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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5.6 L_kns_Lf_
How CriticalAre The UpsetsDue toUnknown Sources:2,4,6,4,6,4,10,3,5,4,5,2,5,10,4,4,3,4,2,6:
Average = 4.7
Standard Deviation = 2.2
Norm411 Nuisance Concern Emergency Injuries Catm_ophic
_o_d_.................0__ .....T_ _o._._........
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 g 10
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STATISTICAL RELATIONSHIPS
C.1 Introduction
In the case of large samples, (n > 100), simple computations of means and standard deviations
are probably sufficient for the objectives of this study. If the sample size is small, (n < 10), means
and deviations suffice, however, there will probably be considerable dispersion of the data. When
the sample size is between these two extremes, some additional sophistication in statistical analysis
is warranted. Two such statistical tools will be used in a few cases in this report, correlation and
rejection of outliers. These methods are briefly introduced in the following two sections.
C.2 Correlation Calculations
Sometimes two sets of data are assumed to be related (based on hypothesis, prior results, etc.)
and we wish to study the validity of the assumption. For example, suppose we wish to study the
relationship between the grades of a group of n students on the midterm exam (x 1, x 2, .... xn) and the
grades on the final exam (Yl, Y2, .... Yn) in a course. If we plot the grades for each student on a set
of Cartesian coordinates, we can study the degree of correlation. If the grades are highly correlated,
then they would approximately fall on a straight line through the origin at 45 degrees. The degree
of correlation can be measured by computing the sample correlation coefficient r. Perfect correlation
is r = 1, where the points all fall on the 45 degree line. If r = 0, there is no correlation and the points
fall on a horizontal straight line. We can develop a formula for r in terms of various moments of x
and y, [Crow 1960, Freund 1973].
We begin by listing the following well known moment formulas:
13
mean of x - _- nl _._ xi (C. 1)
13
- l (c.2)
mean ofy-y-n_._ Yi
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standarddeviationof x = Sx=
(C.3)
Expansion of Eq. (C.3) and simplification leads to another form which is computationally simpler:
J
s__°_:- . /: _4,
And similarly for y
IIn In (C.5)
The covariance of x and y is defined as
cov(x,y) - I° 1/(r_-x-)(yi-y-) n 2 (C.6)
If the formulas are corrected for bias [seeShooman t990, p.83, Crow 1960, p. 12], the denominators
in Eqs. C.4,5,6 become (n)(n- 1) instead of n2, which is an important correction for small sample sizes.
The sample correlation coefficient is defined as the ratio of the covariance to the product of the
standard deviations.
r - cov(x,y)/S_ (C.7)
A BASIC program was written based on these formulas to compute the means, standard deviations,
and correlation coefficient for the data in this report.
Clearly, correlations of 0.98 and 0.99 represent high correlations and those of 0.05 and 0.1
represent very low correlation. However, how are we to interpret values in between. Freund [p. 427]
gives a useful test of the hypothesis that samples are correlated vs. the null hypothesis that they are
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uncorrelated.It canbeshownthatacceptanceof thenull hypothesisisgovernedby thet distribution
where:
t _ rq_-L--_-/ Vt__ r 2 (C.8)
and the t distribution has n-2 degrees of freedom.
correlation analysis.
yields:
The quantity n is the number of samples in the
For the correlation calculations in Table 6.5, n = 6 and solving Eq. (C.8) for r
r - t/_(4 "+ r 2 (C.9)
From the t distribution table [Freund, p. ], for n - 2 = 4 degrees of freedom and a confidence level
of 10%, the value of t = 1.533. Substitution in Eq. (C.9) yields a value for r of 0.608. The conclusion
is that responses in Table 6.5 with a value of r >= 0.608 have a probability of 0.1 or less of having
occurred by chance from uncorrelated data. Thus, we will consider responses with r >= 0.608 as
significantly correlated.
C.3 Statistical Rejection of Outliers
In many cases one value in a set of n data values (Xl, x2..... Xn) seems to be too large (small) as
compared with the remaining body of data. Of course there is always a probability that the point in
question does belong to the distribution represented by the other (n-1) values, and is only an extreme
data point. Thus, it is useful to devise statistical tests which determine the probability that all the n
values belong to the same distribution (the working hypothesis, H) as opposed to the probability that
the one large value belongs to a different distribution then the other (n-l) values (the alternate
hypothesis, H).
The test statistic which is used in many such tests is best explained by assuming that the n
observations are arranged in ascending order, where x 1 is the smallest and x n the largest (i.e. the value
in question). [Barnett, p. 52] We then compute a test statistic T -- (numerator)/(denominator) = N/D.
The numerator is a measure of the separation of the n'th observation from the remainder of the
sample, and the denominator is a measure of the spread of the sample. As an example, for N one
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mightconsiderthe separation between samples n and (n-1), i.e. x n - Xn.1, and for D the range of the
group, x n - x_. This is only illustrative, and other choices for N and D are possible.
In Barnett [Sec. 3.4.2], 16 tests for outliers (also called discordancy) in a set of gamma (including
exponential) samples are presented. If we assume that the time of occurrence of an EMI event is
exponentially distributed, then Epstein [1953] has shown that the sampling distribution of the
occurrence rate (occurrences/hour) is chi-square. This result should also apply to the frequency/year
and the frequency/flight values given in Table 6.8. It is also true that the gamma distribution
becomes the chi-square distribution when the gamma parameter a = 2. Thus we can use one of
Barnett's gamma tests with # = 2 to test the data of Table 6.8 for outliers.
The outlier test we will use from Barnett sets T = outlier value/sum of observations,
T - xn xi
The test leads to a procedure where the test statistic is compared with values from an F distribution
table. We illustrate the procedure by testing the data in Table 6.8. Suppose that we suspect that the
value of 32.4 for respondent #27 is an outlier among the other values of frequency of occurrence
given in the table. Computing T we obtain
T-- 32.4/(0+0+0+0.61+ .... +10+32.4)
T = 32.4/60.93 = 0.5318
The critical value forZ)_)% probability of an outlier (1% critical value) is given on page 290 of Barnett
for _ =2 and n = 12 is 0.3428 < 0.5318. Thus, 32.4 is much too high to be considered from the same
distribution as the other II respondents and should be dropped. We can now test the next largest
vatue,10, to see if it should be included with the other l0 values. Calculating our new T = 10/(60.93
- 32.4) = 0.3505 we see that this is less than 0.3681, the 1% critical value obtained by interpolation
from the table, thus we accept the value of 10.
We can use this same test on the data in the frequency per year column of Table 6.8 to test
weather respondent #23's value of 5.0 is an outlier.
T -- 5/(0+0 + ... + 2.0+5.0) = 5/10.55 = 0.4739
The value given in the table for n= 15 is 0.2882. (The correct value for n = 16 could be obtained by
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interpolationvaluesin the tableand wouldbe slightly smaller). Thus, the valueof 5 shouldbe
rejected. Continuing as before, we now test the next value which is 2. The new value of T =
2/(10.55 - 5) = 0.3604 > 0.2882, thus 2 is also rejected. Testing the third value, l, we have T =
1/(5.55 - 2) = 0.2817 < 0.2882, (the correct value for n = 14 could be obtained by interpolation values
in the table and would be slightly larger), thus this value should be accepted. The means and standard
deviations are recalculated after dropping the rejected values and the results appear in the footnotes
to Table 6.8.
C.4 Interval Estimates
To establish an interval estimate on statistical data one must first know the probability
distribution of the estimate. We have assumed that all the occurrence rates were constant. (There is
no reason to believe otherwise, and there is insufficient data to support models with a varying
occurrence rate). It has been shown by Epstein [1953] that the sample distribution for a constant
occurrence rate has a chi-square (X2) distribution. Specifically 2r = 2nT_t has a chi-square
distribution, where r is the number of observed occurrences, n is the size of the observed population,
T is the length of the observation period, and _. is the occurrence rate, where the lower confidence
band has 2r degrees of freedom and the upper confidence bound has 2r + 2 degrees of freedom.
Simple charts have been computed where the multiplier of the mean time between occurrences at the
upper and lower conficence levels is plotted versus r for various confidence levels, [see Shooman
1990]. From these charts we find that for l0 occurrences of HIRF for pilots, the 80% confidence
interval for the mean time between occurrences is 0.7 × mean to 1.7 x mean. Since the occurrence
rates are the reciprocal of the mean time between occurrences, the required multipliers are the
reciprocals of 0.7 and 1.7, ie. 0.59 and 1.43. Thus for pilot HIRF occurrence rate of 0.53/thousand,
the interval estimate becomes 0.53/1.7 = 0.31 and 0.53/0.7 = 0.76. Similarly for the 4 occurrences of
HIRF for passengers, the occurrence rates become 0.56/2.2 = 0.25 to 0.56/0.6 -- 0.93.
91
APPENDIX D - DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS
If we examine Table D.1 we see that 24 of the 57 respondents provided event
descriptions in Sec. 6.0. I have reproduced these descriptions verbatim in Table D.1. Note
that if a respondent described three events they are listed as Event 1, Event 2, Event 3.
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